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This dissertation contains two chapters: the first chapter examines the impact of sovereign 
wealth fund (SWF) ownership on firm executive compensation and the second examines the 
impact that various dividend payout policies have on stock prices. Below are the individual 
abstracts for each chapter. 
CHAPTER 1: Sovereign wealth funds are major players in the global markets. We 
contribute to the corporate governance literature by examining the possible value SWFs bring to 
their domestic holdings. We examine in particular the impact of SWF ownership on firm 
executive compensation. Using data on Kuwaiti SWFs, we find that having an SWF as an 
ultimate owner diminishes pay–performance sensitivity. This pay performance diminishment is 
greater, the higher the cash flow rights of the SWF. Moreover, having the SWF as an ultimate 
owner in a firm‘s ownership chain does not alleviate the adverse effects of the divergence in 
cash-flow and control rights. This evidence supports the notion that SWFs impose agency costs 
on their targets. (JEL G15, G23, G32, G34, G38)  
CHAPTER 2: Previous research, specifically Larkin et al. (2017), has examined the 
relationship between dividend smoothing and stock prices, coming to a ‗puzzling’ conclusion that 
investors do not value firms that smooth their dividends over those that do. I revisit this question 
by considering the level of payout in an analysis of dividend smoothing. I use a modified version 
of the payout ratio and a novel way of categorizing low/high payout firms to produce two major 
findings. First, investors value firms that put an effort to payout more of their earnings higher 
than firms that do not; this payout price premium is present in all industries. Second, investors do 
value high-payout dividend-smoothing firms more than low-payout dividend smoothers. Finally, 
by taking the extreme portfolios on the payout and smoothness spectrum, I follow the 




firms and find clear and significant negative performance of this portfolio, which depicts the 
price premium I am testing for. This performance is not explained by Fama-French 5 factor or 
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Chapter 1 : How Do Sovereign Wealth Funds Pay the Executives in 




Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are significant players in today‘s global markets holdings 
shares in one out of every five firms worldwide and accounting for about 2  of the global equity 
and bonds markets (Fernandes, 2014; Gieve et al., 2009). They are quite distinct from other 
institutional investors due to their state ownership, mixed objectives, and, for many, no liability 
structure (Megginson and Fotak, 2015). Lately, there has been significant debate and different 
findings as to whether SWFs are active investors that create or destroy value for their investments 
or if they are merely passive investment managers (Alhashel, 2015). In this paper we intend to 
examine one possible effect for SWFs on their firm holdings, that is the firm‘s corporate 
governance. Specifically, we intend to examine how SWFs might enhance or diminish the pay–
performance relationship for the firm‘s executives. 
 Executive compensation is an essential element of corporate governance that incentivizes 
managers to work in the interest of shareholders and reduce agency costs (Berle and Means, 
1991; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Setting compensation packages is 
done by the firm‘s board which could include some of the firm‘s large shareholders. Even when 
large investors do not sit on boards, they still affect the firm and its corporate governance through 
their activism (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Smith, 1996). Indeed, large and institutional shareholder 
have been documented to positively affect the pay–performance relationship (Hartzell and Starks, 
2003; Ozkan, 2007; Sapp, 2008). However, recent evidence indicates that the influence of the 
largest shareholder on executive pay differs based on this shareholder‘s type (Firth et al., 2006). 
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Furthermore, depending on the ownership structure, large shareholders might not always set 
proper incentive schemes for managers (Wang and Xiao, 2011). 
 In many instances SWFs tend to take a majority stake in the firm, this is especially true 
for SWFs‘ domestic investments (Bernstein et al., 2013). Hence, SWFs have considerable 
monitoring incentives and influence on managerial pay (Core and Guay, 1999; Jensen and 
Warner, 1988; Murphy, 1999). This monitoring is achieved through their activism, tendency to sit 
on their firms‘ boards, and/or the corporate governance enhancement proposals they put forward 
(Alhashel, 2015; Boubakri et al., 2016; Dewenter et al., 2010; Fernandes, 2014). However, it is 
not always the case that SWFs take an active role and instead go a passive one (Bortolotti et al., 
2015). Moreover, their mixed objectives that could include non-economic (e.g. political) ones, 
could further hinder their monitoring role and the way executives are compensated (Bernstein et 
al., 2013; Dewenter et al., 2010; Kotter and Lel, 2011). 
 In markets where concentrated ownership is the norm, the capacity of large shareholders 
to influence firm decisions is much greater as it is the largest shareholder, or shareholders, that 
dominate the board, control the firm and, consequently, set executive pay (Firth et al., 2006). 
With such concentrated ownership along comes the divergence of the cash flow and control 
rights of the controlling shareholders that is harmful to firm value (Claessens et al., 2002). This 
divergence allows large shareholders to influence firm decisions through voting rights despite 
relatively smaller cash flow rights. Moreover, it allows majority shareholders and managers to 
expropriate from the firm at the cost of minority shareholders (Chen et al., 2011). One possible 
way for managerial rent-seeking in such a setting is to be able to receive pay that is not 
commensurate with their performance (Cao et al., 2011). Managerial rent-seeking is even more 
true for economies with weak investor protection (La Porta et al., 1999; Johnson et al., 2000). 




significant ownership stakes in domestic firms, and the weakly governed home economies they 
operate in, it becomes essential to understand the impact they have on executive pay. 
 Using data on Kuwaiti firms over the period 2004–2012, we find that in firms where the 
ultimate shareholder is an SWF, managers have a lower pay–performance sensitivity (PPS). The 
drop in the pay–performance sensitivity is higher, the higher the cash flow rights of the SWF. 
This drop is of a meaningful magnitude as a one standard deviation increase in the SWF cash 
flow rights reduces PPS by greater than 50% of its base level. Similar to the extant literature, the 
pay–performance sensitivity deteriorates as the divergence between the control and cash flow 
rights increase (i.e., the firm is further down the ownership chain and away from the ultimate 
shareholder). However, we fail to find consistent evidence on SWF, as the ultimate owner along 
this chain, having any influence on the adverse effect of the cash flow control rights divergence. 
 Our choice of Kuwait is driven by Kuwait being the host for one of the oldest and largest 
SWFs in the world. The latest estimate for Kuwait‘s largest SWF, the Kuwait Investment 
Authority, is US$524 billion, putting it the fourth largest SWF in the world
2
. Another major SWF 
in Kuwait is the Public Institution for Social Security which has an estimated size of US$30 
billion
3
. These Kuwaiti SWFs have significant holdings in the domestic market in which they 
take an active role as evidenced by their board representation. These significant holdings ensure 
that the SWFs have a clear outlet to voice their opinion in the firms‘ affairs, in general, and 
regarding executive compensation, specifically. Last but not least, Kuwaiti SWFs investment 
offer a unique ability to alleviate some of the endogeneity concerns with executive compensation 
and ownership structure. Reducing the endogeneity concern of importance since a possible worry 
with our findings is that SWFs do not bring monitoring value to their holdings but are instead 
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 Fund Rankings — SWFI - Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. https://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/. Accessed 
2 January, 2018. 
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 PIFSS — SWFI - Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. https://www.swfinstitute.org/public-investors/pifss/. Accessed 




attracted to properly run firms with sound corporate governance systems (i.e. clientele effect) 
(Brickley et al., 1988; Allen et al., 2000; Bushee and Noe, 2000). As will be discussed in more 
detail later, Kuwaiti SWFs‘ ownership in the firm was there since the firm‘s establishment and 
not later which would reduce some of the reverse causality concern. Therefore, we would argue 
that there exists some evidence that it is the monitoring of the SWF that brought good governance 
to the firm and not the other way around. 
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First of all, it contributes to the 
institutional investors‘ literature and notably to the growing literature on SWFs. It specifically 
contributes to the ongoing debate on whether SWFs create or destroy value in their target 
investments focusing specifically on their domestic investments (Alhashel, 2015; Megginson and 
Fotak, 2015). In doing so, the paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first paper that has 
examined in a systematic manner the effect of SWFs on a corporate governance mechanism, that 
is executive compensation. By finding that SWFs diminish the pay–performance relationship, we 
provide evidence supporting the notion that SWFs exacerbate agency costs in their domestic 
targets.  
Second, the paper contributes to the literature on state capitalism. There has been a rise in 
the role governments play in markets today which makes it interesting to understand the 
implications of this growing role (Boubakri et al., 2017). A significant literature has evolved 
examining the effect of government ownership through various channels. We specifically 
contribute to the role states have on their domestic holdings through the corporate governance 
maintained within these holdings (e.g., Borisova and Megginson, 2011; Boubakri et al., 2013). 
Firth et al. (2007) shows that state ownership in China does not enhance the pay–performance 




our examination of the effect of SWFs‘ ownership, one form of state ownership, on the pay–
performance relationship. 
Third, it contributes to the literature on executive compensation and ownership structure. 
While several papers have examined the effect of blockholders, blockholder type, and various 
ownership structures on executive pay and the pay–performance relationship (e.g. Masulis et al., 
2009; Kato and Long, 2006; Firth et al., 2006), this is the first paper to investigate the effects of 
the unique type of SWFs on executive pay. The paper also contributes to the literature by 
showing how depending on the owner‘s incentives, and market structure, non-market based 
performance measures could be used as benchmarks for managerial performance. 
Last but not least, this paper contributes to the growing literature on executive 
compensation in emerging markets. Given the unique setting of developing nations that is 
different from that observed in the US or Western Europe, several calls have been made into 
single country research on corporate governance to enhance our understanding of it (Defond and 
Hung, 2004; Kanagaretnam et al., 2009; Sun et al., 2010). Kuwait is an interesting setting to 
examine given the significant level the state plays in the economy and in the equity market. 
Moreover, Kuwait with its large and old SWFs, weak investor protection, ownership 
concentration, and nascent corporate governance rules, makes it an excellent laboratory to test for 
the impact of distinctive entities such as SWFs on firms. 
1.2 Institutional Background 
Kuwait is home to the first and oldest SWF, Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), which 
dates its origins back to 1953
4
. KIA was established to manage the government surpluses 
generated from the oil revenues. It invests those funds locally and internationally. The Sovereign 
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Wealth Funds Institute estimates that KIA has assets under management around US$592 billion 
as of the end of 2016
5
. 
Kuwait also has other funds that can even be considered as SWFs, albeit at a much 
smaller size. The second largest fund is the Public Institute for Social Security (PIFSS) which 
manages the public pension fund
6
. The third fund is the Public Authority for Minors‘ Affairs 
(PAMA) which manages the assets for Kuwaiti minors until they reach legal age. The fourth fund 
is the Kuwait Awqaf Public Foundation (KAPF). KAPF manages assets to spend the returns and 
proceeds generated from these assets on charitable projects and endeavors. The assets of KAPF 
are accumulated through new donations or the organic growth of the previous donations. Hence, 
KAPF is similar in structure to non-profit foundations found in the US and elsewhere. The 
difference, however, is that KAPF is a government entity and not a private one. While PIFSS, 
PAMA, and KAPF are not funded by commodity revenues or foreign exchange reserves, some 
SWF definitions would encompass them due to their nature of being state-managed funds, invest 
in a variety of assets, and have long-term horizons (Balding, 2011; Megginson and Fotak, 2015; 
Truman, 2008). All of those funds have assets that vary, ranging from equities to alternative 
assets and from domestic holdings to international ones
7
. 
These SWFs‘ equity investments in the domestic market tend to be done through two 
channels. The first channel is through investing some of their funds with professional asset 
managers who have high if not full discretion on the allocation and investment of these funds. 
The second channel is direct equity ownership in local firms that tend to be of significant size 
(i.e., ≥ 10%). In the second channel, this direct investment is almost always done from the 
establishment of the firm. In very few instances does one of those funds, over our sample period, 




 PIFSS profile page on the SWF Institute website where it is listed as a SWF. https://www.swfinstitute.org/public-
investors/pifss/ 
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acquire a stake in the firm at a later stage of its life. For example, Kuwait Finance House (KFH), 
one of the largest and oldest Islamic banks in the world, has been owned jointly by KIA, PAMA, 
and KAPF with their ownership totaling about 40% since the bank‘s establishment back in 1977. 
One reason behind KIA‘s such method of investing is Kuwaiti laws that require that when 
establishing any state-owned enterprise that KIA own significant stakes in excess of 20%. The 
remaining shares are divided between the general public and a private firm. This ownership 
structure is valid for firms in which SWFs have direct ownership and does not apply to firms 
down the ownership chain.  
In those firms where the SWFs own a majority, they would have seats on the board 
depending on their ownership stake. Those seats would usually tend to be filled by those funds‘ 
higher management. Through those seats and voting rights, the SWFs, as a dominant shareholder, 
have a significant say in choosing the top management team, setting their pay, and managing the 
firm. However, it could be the case that the SWF is not the only large shareholder of the firm and 
there might be other large shareholders that would also sit on the firm‘s board of directors.  
Kuwait being a developing economy with a relatively small stock exchange especially 
back in the late 90s and early 2000s meant that there was a tiny number of firms to be acquired. 
Therefore, firms did not have the luxury to grow through mergers and acquisitions as evidenced 
in the highly developed corporate control market of the US. Instead, firms would revert to setting 
up new ventures from scratch to enter new businesses and grow. KFH would be one vivid 
example that was setup from scratch with KIA and the other SWFs being founders of the bank. 
Another more recent example is the Aviation Lease and Finance Company (ALAFCO). 
ALAFCO was established by KFH in 2000 giving the bank access to the aircraft leasing market. 
By being on the board of KFH, the SWFs would have had a say on the establishment of such 




This dominant practice of establishing firms from the start (i.e., having the SWF as a 
founder) would mean the decision to invest in the firm is exogenous to the corporate governance 
setup later on as the firm starts running. By having the decision to invest exogenously made, we 
argue that our findings allow us to make causal inference between the ownership structure of the 
firm and the pay–performance relationship. In other words, the argument that the SWFs were 
attracted to firms with good corporate governance practices does not apply here. The decision on 
how much to invest is as exogenous as the decision to invest when the firm was just on paper 
with no running operations or management to be paid or corporate governance mechanisms in 
place. However, the SWFs could later on after the firm is up and running alter their investment 
and ownership level which would raise concerns regarding the endogeneity of the decision. It is 
possible that the corporate governance of the firm has a say on the decision of the SWF to 
increase or decrease its ownership. If this is the case, it would undoubtedly weaken our causal 
conclusion from the analysis in Sections 1.5.2 and 1.5.3 in which we examine the effect of the 
size and structure of the ownership of the SWF on the pay–performance relationship. 
1.3 Hypothesis Development 
SWFs are institutional investors that are unique and different from other kinds of 
institutional investors (Megginson and Fotak, 2015). They are state-owned investment vehicles 
funded by foreign exchange reserves, commodity revenues, government budget surplus, or 
pension surplus that invest in various asset classes globally (Alhashel, 2015). Furthermore, they 
tend to have mixed objectives and are not limited to the standard financial aim of maximizing the 
managed wealth. SWFs could be called upon to support their domestic economies, acting in some 
cases as investors and lenders of last resort, as well as possibly having the mandate to generate 




additional feature of SWFs is their ability to be very long-term investors. For example, KIA has 
owned shares in Daimler, the owners of Mercedes-Benz, since 1974. KIA‘s long-term holdings 
are not constrained to international ones only. KIA has owned shares in Zain, the largest 
telecommunications operator in Kuwait, since its establishment in 1983. 
SWFs, as institutional investors, could be able to bring value to their target investments 
through their monitoring, activism, and board representation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Smith, 
1996). SWFs value-added is further augmented by their very long investment horizons and little 
liquidity needs which could allow them to reach high and effective monitoring levels (Boubakri 
et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2007). This high monitoring level would result in a better alignment of 
managerial and shareholder interests prone to blockholders as captured by evidence of higher 
pay–performance sensitivity (Ke et al., 1999; Kim, 2010; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; John et al., 
2010). This high monitoring is not without its costs, and yet it is significant long-term investors 
such as SWFs that can afford it (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Khan et al., 2005; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986). Indeed, various work has found that SWFs bring value to their investments 
through activism and better governance (Boubakri et al., 2016; Dewenter et al., 2010; Fernandes, 
2014; Sojli and Wah Tham, 2011).  
An additional channel through which SWFs bring value is through their political and 
government connections. Dewenter et al. (2010) document various instances in which SWFs‘ 
targets firms receive favorable government decisions that range from advantageous government 
regulation to being awarded lucrative government contracts and tenders. Similar evidence is 
found by Fernandes (2014). Therefore, we hypothesize the following, 
H1a SWFs enhance the pay–performance sensitivity of manager pay. 
However, being state-owned entities could eventually limit SWFs‘ monitoring of firm 




(Megginson and Fotak, 2015; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), a detachment from the firm that is 
prone in states (Shleifer, 1998), or the pursuit of non-economic goals (Arouri et al., 2018). If the 
firm was required to achieve non-financial social objectives (e.g., employment), then managers 
would not be paid according to their financial performance but based on those non-financial 
social targets. These arguments do have empirical backing that shows that SWFs are value 
destroying or do not bring value to their targets (Kotter and Lel, 2011; Knill et al., 2012b; 
Bortolotti et al., 2015). Therefore, we hypothesize the following, 
H1b SWFs diminish the pay–performance sensitivity of manager pay. 
In environments with weak investor protection, lack of proper corporate governance rules, 
and abundant use of cross-holdings and pyramid structures, large shareholders 
have greater incentives to monitor managers and ensure their interests are aligned.  
The monitoring incentives and ability could potentially be even higher for SWFs. Recall 
that SWFs are very long-term investors with negligible liquidity needs which positions them to 
become very effective monitors (Bushee, 1998; Chen et al., 2007). Empirical evidence does 
indeed find support for this monitoring argument and for the benefits such monitoring brings to 
target firms (Dewenter et al., 2010; Fernandes, 2014; Sojli and Wah Tham, 2011). Moreover, 
SWFs‘ ownership tends to reduce the credit risk and cost of firms (Bertoni and Lugo, 2014). By 
reducing the credit cost of firms, this could result in a higher cash flow in the hands of 
management which they are free to use. High levels of free cash flow tend to increase the 
probability of misuse and agency costs (Jensen, 1986). Moreover, the lower credit risk found for 
SWFs target investments is a conclusion from the notion that SWFs would bailout their target 
firms if these firms faced financial difficulties. This sense of bail out would increase 




activities (Arrow, 1963; Pauly, 1968). Both of these channels should result in SWFs having 
greater incentives to monitor. 
The monitoring incentives of SWFs are further augmented by their role as deep pools of 
capital. Firms owned by a SWF are much more likely to issue equity after the SWF has acquired 
a stake in the firm (Fernandes, 2014). By having greater capital injected into the target firm, the 
SWF has greater capital at risk and would want to ensure that this new capital is deployed in 
value-enhancing activities (Demiralp et al., 2011).  Therefore, a SWF is further inclined to 
enhance their monitoring. 
The higher monitoring ability and incentive of SWF, of course, would increase as the 
amount of cash flow rights the SWF has increases (Burns et al., 2010; Cao et al., 2011). Hence, 
we hypothesize that, 
H2a SWF’s cash flow rights have a positive effect on the pay–performance sensitivity of 
manager pay. 
The governmental nature of SWFs while providing them with a very long-term outlook 
and deep pools of capital could also have its negative effects. SWFs could act in varying manners 
that tend to be driven by political reasons, not economic ones. For example, SWFs could appoint 
non-qualified directors in their target firms‘ boards only because of their political connections. 
Such directors might then not perform their proper monitoring duty. SWFs could invest in firms 
for non-economic motives such as bailing out politically connected firms or engage in other 
forms of political rent-seeking (Faccio et al., 2006; Megginson and Fotak, 2015; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994). For example, SWFs could use their large influence within the target firm to 
expropriate the firm‘s assets, sell it at a discount to powerful rent-seeking agents within the 
economy, or distort its investment decisions (Borisova et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2011; Park et al., 




(Dinç, 2005; Iannotta et al., 2013). Such influence for the SWF would be greater, the greater its 
cash flow rights. Meanwhile, pursuing such an agenda and such goals would break-down the 
relationship between pay and performance for top management. Thus, we hypothesize that, 
H2b SWF‘s cash flow rights have a negative effect on the pay–performance sensitivity of 
manager pay. 
However, as the cash flow and control rights diverge, the monitoring incentives for large 
shareholders are weakened and instead those shareholders are found to pursue their private 
interests at the expense of other shareholders. Such expropriation would occur through-tunneling, 
related party sales, and transferring profits out of the company for personal gains (Fan et al., 
2011; Johnson et al., 2000). Expropriations are truer when firms have weak corporate governance 
mechanisms and disclosure requirements (Ding et al., 2007). While such expropriation incentives 
might not be there for SWFs, they could indeed be of interest to the other large shareholders who 
actively manage the firm through their board seats. SWFs, hence, could act as monitors not just 
of firm managers but of other majority shareholders ensuring they do not expropriate from the 
firm at the expense of the SWF and the minority shareholders. In other words, SWFs could have 
a moderating effect on the negative effect of the cash flow control rights divergence. In fact, there 
is empirical evidence showing that state control does dampen the negative effects of the wedge 






H3a SWFs are able to dampen the negative effect of cash flow control rights divergence 
on the pay–performance sensitivity of manager pay. 
However, with the firm so far along the ownership chain, it might be hard for the SWF to 
ensure other majority shareholders are not expropriating the firm, the managers are not colluding 
with other majority shareholders to extract rents, and/or that managers are paid in a manner 
commensurate with their performance (i.e., properly monitored) (Cao et al., 2011; Wang and 
Xiao, 2011; Cheung et al., 2006; Jiang et al., 2010). Moreover, the same negative issues 
discussed above for hypothesis H2b regarding the misuse of the firm resources for political and 
social gains would be further exasperated by this divergence of cash flow control rights. 
Therefore, we hypothesize the following, 
H3b SWFs fail to reduce the negative effect of cash flow control rights divergence on the 
pay–performance sensitivity of manager pay. 
1.4 Data and Variable Definitions 
 In this section we discuss our sample and variables constructions and provide summary 
statistics on them. 
1.4.1 Sample 
 Our data consists of data on publicly listed firms on the KSE over the period 2004-2012. 
2004 is the year firms started reporting in their annual reports the top executives‘ compensation 
figures. To compile our database, we first started by hand collecting executive compensation 
information directly from the annual reports. Ownership information is provided by Aljoman 
Consulting. Financial information is obtained from the National Investment Company Investor 
Pocket Guide and Worldscope. Information on market values is provided through Alshall 




characteristics and regulations. Following the combining of those datasets, we arrive at a final 
sample compromising 160 firms and 906 firm-year observations. 
1.4.2 Variable Definitions 
1.4.2.1 Executive Compensation 
 Kuwaiti firms have been required to report executive compensation in their annual 
reports‘ footnotes since 2004. The information provided on compensation is (a) salaries and other 
short-term benefits, (b) other benefits, and (c) total compensation. The other benefits category is 
only used by a small number of firms. No information is provided on the nature of the other 
benefits categories and is only reported for about 10% of firm-year observations in our sample. 
Given its unclear nature and the scarcity of its use, we focus instead on the cash and short-term 
benefits category. Such a focus would go along with the extant literature on emerging markets 
examining mostly cash pay (Chen et al., 2010; Firth et al., 2006, 2007; Cao et al., 2011; Conyon 
and He, 2011). Moreover, this focus on cash and short-term benefits goes along with the norm in 
KSE firms in which stock options are not a dominant form of compensation. The few firms that 
do use stock options do not disclose it clearly with some firms using the term Other 
compensation which may include other items unclear to us
8
. 
  The information on executive compensation is provided for the whole top management 
team and is not reported separately by executive. We take the top management aggregate value of 
the salaries and other short-term benefits category as our measure of executive compensation. 
Since no information is provided in the annual reports on the number of executives included in 
the compensation figures, we refrain from examining levels of pay and focus instead on pay–
performance relationships only. 
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1.4.2.2 Firm Performance 
 To estimate the pay–performance sensitivity (PPS), we need to tie changes in pay to 
changes in firm performance. PPS, hence, would be the dinar change in executive compensation 
given a dinar change in firm performance
9
 We use three different firm performance measures 
based on accounting and market performance. These are change in market value, change in sales, 
and change in net income. The use of three different measures is driven by the possible 
inclination some boards might have towards market performance against accounting 
performance, or vice versa. We first start by examining a market-based measure as captured by 
the change in equity market value (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 1985). Such a measure 
would tie directly to the increase in shareholders wealth, is less open to managerial manipulation, 
and reflects a longer-term view of the firm.  
A downside, however, for the use of changes in market cap is the possibility that the 
informational efficiency of stock prices is weak or not strong enough and would vary 
significantly across different firms (Abdmoulah, 2010; Al-Ajmi and Kim, 2012; Alhashel, 2016). 
Moreover, changes in market cap could be affected by factors beyond managerial control such as 
macroeconomic shocks. To offset for the low informational efficiency of the market and for the 
non-controllable factors, firms tend to rely more on accounting-based measures of performance 
(Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Sloan, 1993). The use of accounting-based performance measures is 
further needed given that bonuses are usually sticky and tend to be tied to accounting profitability 
(Murphy, 1999; Schaefer, 1998). The need to use accounting-based measures is also driven by an 
institutional feature of SWFs in Kuwait. All SWFs are monitored by the State Audit Bureau 
(SAB), an independent organization that audits all government entities and ensures the proper use 
of public funds. In performing this role, SAB annually produces a report regarding all 
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governmental entities in Kuwait that includes the SWFs, their significant investments, and the 
overall performance of the fund as well as the individual investments or firms. The annual report 
is submitted to and discussed at length in the parliament and any red flags raised by SAB could 
potentially lead to a drilling of the responsible government minister. In assessing the performance 
of SWFs‘ investments, SAB would in many instances focus on the accounting performance of the 
target firms. Therefore, this would push the SWFs to ensure the proper accounting performance 
of their holdings. 
To adequately address these issues and to capture the possible variation across 
boardrooms in setting performance targets, we augment the market measure with two accounting-
based measures, change in sales and change in net income (Core and Guay, 1999). We look at 
sales given its better reflection of the operating performance of the firm as net income could be 
more susceptible to accounting manipulation as well as including non-core earnings such as asset 
sales. We look at contemporaneous changes in our firm performance measures when assessing 
the PPS for all of our specifications. 
 
1.4.2.3 SWFs, Cash Flow Rights and Control Rights 
In assessing the effect of SWFs on executive pay, we determine the ultimate controlling 
shareholder by tracking it across the ownership chain. We define a principal ultimate owner as 
the shareholder ultimately owning the largest portion of the firm‘s shares with the proportion 
being no less than 10% (Cao et al., 2011; Claessens et al., 2002). In this paper, we are interested 
in understanding the effect of the ownership of SWFs. We define SWF ownership as a firm 
ultimately owned by one of the four SWFs operating in Kuwait; KIA, PIFSS, KAPF, and PAMA. 




ownership and consider them all as a single entity. This computation would fit as all four funds 
are state-owned with some being chaired by the same minister, such as KIA and PIFSS, which 
would create similarity in their goals, mandates, and behavior. KIA is by far the largest with 
significant assets under management putting it amongst the largest SWFs in the world (Alhashel, 
2015). 
We also examine the effects of the divergence of control and cash flow rights on PPS. We 
define control rights as the minimum level of ownership in the ownership chain of the ultimate 
major shareholder. Cash flow rights are defined as the product of the ownership levels along the 
ownership chain (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002). The divergence between the two is 
calculated as control rights minus cash flow rights. The divergence between cash flow and 
controls rights is an essential feature of ownership structures as it measures the degree of 
entrenchment, agency problems, and value destruction in the firm (Claessens et al., 2002; 
Grossman and Hart, 1986). Such a divergence would emerge when ownership is based on 
pyramid structures and cross-holdings (La Porta et al., 1999). To get a sense of how cash flow 
and control rights are measured, let‘s assume firm A has a 35% ownership in firm B. Firm A, in 
turn, is owned by a private family firm where they hold 10% of firm A‘s shares. The family 
firm‘s cash flow rights would be 35%   10% = 3.5%, and their control rights would be the 
minimal shareholding level along the ownership chain which is 10%. 
1.4.3 Sample Statistics 
 Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics for our sample. We can see that the average top 
management team (TMT) receives almost KWD 590,000 in cash pay annually which corresponds 
to about USD 2 million given the exchange rate observed during the sample period (KWD 1   




leverage of about 28%. Tobin‘s q is defined as total market capitalization plus debt divided by 
total book value of assets and leverage is debt divided by the book value of assets. The ultimate 
owner in the average (median) firm has cash flow rights of about 21% (14%) and a cash flow 
control rights divergence of approximately 4% (0%). Such figures would indicate that about half 
of the ultimate owners have direct ownership in the firm and not through cross-holdings and 
pyramid structures. SWFs are the ultimate owners in about 14% of the firm-year observations. 
To get a better sense of our sample, we compare firms that have a SWF is an ultimate 
owner versus those that do not have a SWF as the ultimate owner. The comparison is reported in 
Table 1.2. We can observe various things from the table. First of all, we can clearly see that firms 
that are ultimately owned by SWFs tend to be significantly larger as measured by market cap, 
assets size, sales, and net income. Moreover, they tend to have a higher Tobin‘s q. While there 
are no differences in the cash flow rights of the ultimate owner, firms owned ultimately by SWFs 
tended to have higher cash flow-control rights divergence. 
Table 1.3 shows us the evolution of pay over the sample years. We can see that pay 
continued increasing until 2007 after which it dropped following the significant drop in the 
market at the end of 2008 which continued well into 2009. Following 2008 pay almost remained 
flat in terms of averages except for 2010. Table 1.4 shows the distribution of compensation across 
the KSE sectors. We can see that there are significant variations across the industries with the 
Insurance (Investment) sector having the lowest (highest) pay. The variation in wage across 
industries, however, is less when looking at the median pay. This variation is most likely due to 
the significant firm size variation that is observed within some industries. 
Table 1.5 provides insight into proportion of firms with an SWF as an ultimate owner. We 
can see that the SWFs‘ ultimate ownership by 2012 was half the ownership levels they had at the 




owner with no less than 10% control rights in the firm. This drop in the proportion of firmly 
ultimately owned by an SWF is driven by changes in the sample composition as an increasing 
number of new firms got listed over the sample period, mostly small firms, that do not have SWF 
ownership. Over our sample period, in firms where SWF are the ultimate owners, their cash flow 
rights start at an average of about 22.5% in 2004 raising to a peak of 27.5% in 2008 to go back to 
24.7% at the end of our sample period. 
Table 1.6 shows the correlation matrix of our variables. We can see, as is heavily 
documented in the extant literature, that pay is highly correlated with firm size, whether 
measured using market cap, total assets, or sales. 
1.5 Empirical Results 
In this section, we examine the effect of having an SWF as the ultimate owner on PPS for the 
firm‘s executives. We start by examining the effect of the mere presence of an SWF, H1, and 
then expand by taking into account its cash flow rights. Our last set of analysis intends to test H2 
and H3 regarding the cash flow rights and the cash flow control rights divergence of the SWF on 
the PPS. 
1.5.1 SWF And Pay-Performance Relationship 
 Our first step is to examine the PPS in Kuwaiti listed firms while taking into account the 
impact of having an SWF as an ultimate owner. We do that by estimating the following model 
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where   and   represent firm and year, respectively,      is the change in pay as defined earlier, 




performance measure,     is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest shareholder is a SWF 
and zero otherwise,   are control variables10, γ is the industry fixed effect, ζ is the year fixed 
effect, and   is the error term. All errors are clustered at the firm level (Petersen, 2009). By 
examining the change in compensation relative to the change in performance, as in Equation (1), 
we would be able to assess the degree of alignment in the interests of the managers and the 
shareholders (i.e., the pay-performance sensitivity) (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Coughlan and 
Schmidt, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 1985). Furthermore, sensitivity specifications 
can easily be interpreted economically and would straightforwardly tell us the managerial share 
of the value creation (Murphy, 1999). Additionally, change specifications allow us to control for 
CEO-specific factors and eliminate time-invariant firm fixed effect (Conyon and He, 2011; 
Jackson et al., 2008; Murphy, 1999). 
Similar to Hartzell and Starks (2003), Firth et al. (2006), Conyon and He (2011) and Cao 
et al. (2011), we control for Tobin‘s  , firm size, and leverage. Firm size, measured as the market 
cap of the firm, has extensively been documented as related to executive pay and the PPS and the 
level of institutional ownership in the firm (Murphy, 1999; Conyon, 1997; Baker and Hall, 2004; 
Schaefer, 1998; Sias and Starks, 1997)
11
. Tobin‘s  , a proxy for growth opportunities, has been 
shown to affect managerial incentives. Smith and Watts (1992) and Harvey and Shrieves (2001) 
argue that firms with more significant growth opportunities are harder to monitor and hence it 
becomes essential to use pay incentive mechanisms to align the interests of shareholders and 
managers. Leverage can affect the structure of compensation contracts used by the firm to better 
align the interests of managers and debtholders (John and John, 1993). The use of industry fixed 
effects is to capture any industry-specific practices regarding compensation, industry-specific 
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managerial talents, or SWF‘s preference for specific industries (Lippert et al., 1994). Table 1.4 
shows a list of the industries in our sample following the KSE classification
12
. Year fixed effects 
are used to capture any macroeconomic shocks to the whole market. The Equation (1) estimate 
are shown in Table 1.7 for the three different performance measures. The table indicates that 
there exists a PPS on average as evidenced by the significant and positive coefficients on 
           and           . The evidence indicates that KWD 1,000 change in market cap 
(net profit) increases top managerial pay by KWD 2 (5). The existence of a relationship between 
pay and performance is certainly a positive element of the corporate governance of Kuwaiti firms 
when compared to other emerging markets firms where the evidence is mixed (Firth et al., 2006; 
Wang and Xiao, 2011). Nevertheless, there is much room for improvement as the sensitivities are 
much lower than those reported for more developed markets (Murphy, 1999). We also find that 
larger firms have greater pay change. More importantly, we fail to find any evidence having an 
SWF as the ultimate ownership has any significant effect on the PPS. 
We now move on to examine whether the size of the ownership of the SWF as captured 
by the cash flow rights has any effects on the PPS. 
1.5.2 SWF Cash Flow Rights, and Pay-Performance Relationship 
 In this section, we care to look at the size of the ultimate owner‘s incentives by examining 
his cash flow rights instead of a dummy variable as in the previous section. By examining the 
ultimate owner‘s cash flow rights, we can further understand the effect of SWFs ownership on the 
PPS as their incentives in the firm changes. We adjust our previous specification in a vain similar 
to that of Firth et al. (2006, 2007), Canarella and Nourayi (2008), and Cao et al. (2011). It is, 
then, as follows, 
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                                                   (2) 
where     Cash is the cash flow rights of the SWF and                  is the cash flow 
rights of the ultimate owner. By controlling for the level of the cash flow rights for the ultimate 
owner, we are also capturing the monitoring incentives for the largest shareholder in the 
ownership chain (Chen et al., 2007; Giannetti and Laeven, 2009)
13
. 
 The estimates are shown in Table 1.8 broken down by our three performance measures. 
As we had established in the previous table, there is some evidence on a positive and significant 
relationship between performance and pay when performance is measured using net income. The 
PPS in this specification is close to the PPS in Table 1.7 when performance is measured using net 
income. Moreover, we also find some evidence that higher cash flow rights increase PPS as 
captured by the positive and significant coefficient of                  . This is in line with 
the findings of Cao et al. (2011) on the positive relationship between the largest shareholder‘s 
cash flow rights and PPS. 
We now move on to look at the interaction terms between performance and the cash flow 
rights of SWFs. We can see that as SWFs‘ cash flow rights increased, the PPS is reduced. This is 
true for two of our performance measures, market cap and sales. This diminishment that SWFs 
bring to the pay-performance elasticity is statistically significant at the 5% and 1% for changes in 
market cap and changes in sales, respectively. A one standard deviation increase in SWF‘s cash 
flow rights, that is 0.2, results in the pay-performance elasticity using market cap reaching 
0.001+0.003*0.2-0.007*0.2 = 0.0002, an 87.5% drop from the base elasticity of 0.001+0.003*0.2 
= 0.0016. In other words, a one standard deviation increase in the SWF cash flow rights abolishes 
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any relationship between pay and performance. The SWF cash flow depreciation of PPS happens 
also when performance is measured using net income. These results are in contrast to those of 
Cao et al. (2011) and Wang and Xiao (2011) that show that the state‘s cash flow rights have a 
positive effect on PPS. 
Overall, the results support hypothesis H2b that the higher the cash flow rights of SWFs, 
the higher the hindrance they bring to the firm by not paying managers commensurately with 
their performance. This goes along with the findings of Bortolotti et al. (2015) that SWFs destroy 
value in their targets and that this destruction is more pronounced when SWFs take board seats 
and have greater ownership. 
1.5.3 SWF, Ownership Structure, and Pay-Performance Relationship 
 In this section, we examine the intersection of SWF ownership and the structure they 
utilize to hold the firm‘s shares. Mainly, we try to understand how PPS is affected by pyramid 
structures or cross-holdings in which the ultimate owner residing at the top of the chain is an 
SWF. Here we utilize our earlier specification, Equation (2), but use cash flow control rights 
divergence in place of cash flow rights, as in Cao et al. (2011), as follows, 
                                                                  
                    (3) 
where         is the cash flow control rights divergence of SWF and     is the cash 
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Table 1.9 reports the estimates of Equation (3). As in our earlier tables, we find that a pay-
performance relationship exists that is statistically significant for the average firm when 
performance is measured using sales and net income. We can see in column 1 that a higher the 
divergence in the cash flow and control rights of the ultimate shareholder results in a reduction in 
the PPS as evidenced by the negative coefficients on ∆Market Cap*CCD. This effect is 
statistically significant at 5%. This adverse effect is in line with the findings in the literature (Cao 
et al., 2011). 
More importantly is the effect of having the ultimate shareholder as an SWF on the 
divergence-pay relationship. We fail to find any effect for SWFs‘ cash flow control rights 
divergence on PPS. This goes along with the work of Knill et al. (2012b) which show that SWFs 
do not bring value to their targets. 
To summarize, we find evidence in support of our hypothesis that a more considerable 
divergence between the cash flow and control rights result in a weaker PPS. This finding goes 
along with the extant literature that the separation of ownership and control fosters weaker 
corporate governance and, hence, allowing managers and majority shareholders to enjoy rents at 
the expense of shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 1999). This weaker PPS could 
be explained that as firms move down the ownership chain away from their ultimate shareholder, 
it becomes easier for management or other majority shareholders to expropriate from the firm and 
for management not be paid in a manner commensurate with their performance. Moreover, 
having a SWF as the ultimate shareholder at the end of this chain does not reduce the adverse 
effect of this distance and reduced monitoring ability. 
1.6 Robustness 




1.6.1 The Effect of Non-SWFs Large Owners 
 One possible concern with our findings is that the documented SWF effect on the PPS 
could be happening as a result from any large owners, may they be a family or an institution, 
regardless of their type. To disentangle this effect, we would need to observe the impact of non-
SWFs ownerships on the PPS. We do this by adding to Equation (1) a dummy variable for large 
non-SWF owners and an interaction between the performance measure and this dummy variable. 
We define the non-SWF large owner dummy as equal to one if the firm is ultimately owned by a 
non-SWF entity with ownership greater than 10%; 0 otherwise. We report the results in Table 
1.10. We find that our negative effect of SWF on PPS holds even after controlling for the possible 
impact of other large shareholders. 
 An alternative way to address this concern also would be to rerun specifications 1-3 using 
a sample where all firm-year observations have a large shareholder (i.e. an ultimate shareholder 
with control rights greater than 10%.) Doing it this way ensures that the base case we are 
comparing the SWFs to are the non-SWF large owners only. In other words, the coefficients on 
the SWF variable and its interaction would give us the incremental effect SWFs have beyond that 
of other large shareholders. The vast majority of those non-SWF large owners tend be either 
family firms or private firms. The results for this subsample are reported in Table 1.11. We can 
see that the sample did not decrease much relative to the earlier tables which is evidence that the 
vast majority of firms in our sample have large controlling shareholders. The findings are in line 
with earlier tables with similar magnitudes and statistical significance. The only exception is that 
we find some positive effect for SWFs on PPS through reducing the adverse effects of the cash 
flow control rights divergence. 
Therefore, we can see that the SWF effect on PPS is distinct from other types of 




1.6.2 KIA Only 
 PIFSS, PAMA, and KAPF are not purely SWFs as KIA is. Therefore, they could have 
different objectives from their target investments which might influence their monitoring and 
activism. To eliminate any possible bias due to these differences, we rerun our analysis using 
defining SWF ownership as KIA‘s ownership only. In the original analysis, those four funds‘ 
ownership were lumped together. Table 1.12 reports the results for specifications 1-3 using the 
new SWF definition. We arrive to similar results as to those in Tables 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9 in terms of 
statistical significance and even in terms of coefficient magnitude. This goes to show that our 
original results were mostly driven by KIA‘s ownership and to the robustness of our results. 
1.6.3 Stable Ownership 
 As we stated earlier, the SWFs were founders of the firm before the start of any 
operations and before any compensation‘s mechanisms were put in place. However, subsequent 
changes in ownership could weaken the casual inference of the SWF ownership on PPS. In an 
effort to try and address this concern, we restrict our sample to firms with a direct (i.e., no cash 
flow control divergence) stable SWF ownership that existed from the start, except for very 
negligible changes (e.g., a 1% change when the ownership is much greater than 20%). We then 
create a matched sample for our restricted subsample. We match firms based on cash flow rights, 
market cap, Tobin‘s q, leverage, year, and industry. All of the matched firms would also have 
direct stable ownerships. By focusing on such firms, we are removing the 
effect of any subsequent ownership changes that could be due to SWF selecting into firms based 
on their governance. We can make this argument due to the fact that the SWF made their 
founding investment of the firm exogenous to the corporate governance mechanisms that came 




 The results for specifications 1 and 2 are reported in Table 1.13. We use the KIA only 
definition for SWF ownership as in Section 1.6.2. We find that for firms in which the SWFs 
did not change their ownership over time, having KIA as the ultimate owner from inception has 
resulted in a weaker pay-performance relationship. Moreover, the dampening effect KIA 
has on PPS is exasperated the higher KIA‘s ownership is as evidenced by the negative and 
statistically significant coefficients in columns 4 and 5. These results are as strong as those in 
Tables 1.7 and 1.8. This goes to show the robustness of our results and that it is KIA who has this 
effect on its portfolio companies. 
1.6.4 Fixed Effects Estimation16 
 Even though the SWFs were founders of the firm, and hence their decision to invest was 
exogenous to the corporate governance mechanisms that came into place later on, any 
changes in the ownership level later on during the firm‘s life are not immune to a selection bias. 
This selection bias into certain firms could be affected by a host of firm characteristics, 
observable and unobservable. To help alleviate some of this concern, we use a firm fixed-effects 
model to capture the time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics.  
We repeat our previous analysis using firm fixed effects. The estimates are reported in 
Table 1.14. We arrive to similar results as in our previous tables. A higher cash flow ownership 
in the firm by the SWF results in a lower PPS. This is consistent across all three performance 
measures. The size of this dampening effect as measured by the coefficients in specifications 4 
and 5 is similar to that seen in previous tables. These results further augment our earlier findings 
on the negative effects of SWFs on PPS. 
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 The rise of SWFs over the last decades has attracted significant attention from both 
academics and practitioners. This attention was especially true at the dawn of the 2008 financial 
crisis when several SWFs acted as lenders and investors of last resort for some of the most 
significant global banks. The unique structure and objectives of SWFs, in comparison to other 
institutional investors, has been a significant impetus in trying to understand them. In this paper, 
we tried to contribute to the literature‘s understanding of SWFs as investors and the potential 
value they could bring to or destroy in their firm holdings. We tackle this by examining the effect 
SWFs have on executive compensation in their domestic firm holdings. Specifically, we 
investigate their effect on the alignment of managerial pay and performance in Kuwaiti listed 
firms. 
 We show that SWFs bring significant attenuation to the alignment of executive pay to 
performance. This influence is more significant the higher the cash flow rights of the SWF in 
the firm are. A one standard deviation increase in the SWF cash flow rights reduces the PPS by 
no less than half, a very notable increase. Moreover, the SWF‘s position as an ultimate 
shareholder does not diminish the adverse effects of the cash flow control rights divergence.  
We argue that this evidence while not wholly free of endogeneity, does carry some causal 
weight. We base this argument on the fact that the SWFs were the founders of the firm and, 
therefore, the decision to invest was exogenous to the compensation scheme and corporate 
governance practices applied to the firm later in its life after it was established. However, this 
argument is weakened by the fact that later changes in the ownership level could be a 
manifestation of a clientele effect. To help further overcome this, we ran several robustness tests. 




firms to other firms along similar firm characteristics. We also ran a fixed-effects models to 
capture the time-invariant firm characteristics. Our results remain robust after conducting those 
two tests. 
The results indicate that SWFs destroy value in their domestic target holdings. We show 
that this value destruction is achieved by misaligning managerial compensation to firm 
performance. SWFs are able to influence managers compensation through their board 
representation. This failure in board activism and in enhancing the firm‘s corporate governance 
enhancements is in line the extant literature on the failure of state-owned entities in this regard. 
The findings indicate that SWFs do not necessarily directly tie managerial pay to firm 
performance. This conclusion goes to support the previous findings of Bortolotti et al. (2015) on 
the agency costs imposed by SWFs on their target shareholdings. These agency costs could either 
be due to the use of the target shareholding for non-economic objectives, or improper monitoring 
by the SWF, and/or extracting firm resources for political favors (Arouri et al., 2018; Bernstein et 
al., 2013; Megginson and Fotak, 2015; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Shleifer, 1998). 
The finding that SWFs aggravate agency costs in their firms should promote additional 
research on which channel is the most likely culprit. Research needs to address whether managers 
are not being well monitored or is it the case that the state uses the SWF‘s assets to bestow 
political favors and are there any moderators to these effects. The second case is very likely to 
happen in markets such as Kuwait where the state is a major player with a significant 
contribution to the country‘s GDP. Moreover, many of the countries with SWFs observe many 
instances where business owners enter politics which puts them in a better position to extract 
rents from the state (Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2008; Kamrava et al., 2016; 
Nosova, 2018). Hence, the findings would carry policy implications with regard to SWFs 




politics. This could be achieved by taking steps of giving the SWF further independence and 
enhancing the role of professionals in the SWF‘s board and reducing that of political appointees, 
if not removing them completely. While SWFs are used for domestic economic development, the 
findings should push SWFs to invest more abroad where their assets could be less used to extract 
rent. Directing more of their assets into foreign markets would go along with their bigger goal of 
intergenerational wealth preservation and economic stabilization in which diversification plays a 
major role. 
Future research could also try to understand whether SWFs behavior depends on whether 
their target holdings were domestic or international. Investigating the effects along domestic and 
international holdings is of importance given the diverse range of behaviors that SWFs observe 
with foreign holdings vis-´a-vis domestic ones (Dewenter et al., 2010; Kotter and Lel, 2011; 
Rose, 2008) Such a difference across countries could arise due to the mixed objectives SWFs 
might have with their local investments (Arouri et al., 2018). Moreover, SWFs behavior in 
international markets could differ based on the host country‘s reception of foreign investments 
and the type of diplomatic relations the SWF‘s country and the host have (Boubakri et al., 2016; 





Table  1.1: Summary Statistics 
This table provides summary statistics for the variables used. Variables are as defined in section 
1.9. The sample consists of Kuwait non-bank firms over the sample period 2004-2012. All figures 
are in Kuwaiti Dinar. 
 
 
  N Mean Median Min Max SD 
Cash Pay (thousands) 960 551.8 273.4 21.53 6906 977.5 
Market Cap (millions) 947 147.7 51 2.195 7241.4 459.2 
Tobin’s q 947 1.121 0.950 0.129 7.310 0.661 
Total Assets (millions) 960 190.8 94.29 1.975 5568.2 417.8 
Sales (millions) 952 58.89 13.49 -72.29 2003.1 204.9 
Net Income (millions) 953 6.609 1.858 -282.0 521.7 41.65 
Leverage 960 0.283 0.264 0 4.197 0.246 
Cash Flow Rights 926 0.207 0.136 0 0.958 0.202 
CCD 926 0.0416 0 0 0.274 0.0680 
SWF 926 0.123 0 0 1 0.329 
Δ Market Cap 792 -12022.9 -3307.5 -3645947.8 3052164.5 231074.0 
Δ Sales 795 3567.0 290 -1994098 1342699 105219.6 
Δ Net Income 797 -1956.1 127.0 -497566 471621 46057.1 







Table  1.2: Summary Statistics by SWF Ownership 
This table provides mean comparisons for the variables used between SWF and non-SWF owned. 
Variables are as defined in section 1.9. The sample consists of Kuwait non-bank firms over the 
sample period 2004-2012. All figures are in Kuwaiti Dinar. 
 
 
  Non-SWF-owned SWF-owned t -statistics 
Market Cap (millions) 103.8 432.6 7.25*** 
Tobin’s q 1.092 1.203 1.68* 
Total Assets (millions) 155.4 429.7 6.68*** 
Sales (millions) 49.28 109.3 2.91*** 
Net Income (millions) 3.336 23.65 5.02*** 
Leverage 0.282 0.305 0.92 
Cash Flow Rights 0.211 0.180 -1.51 







Table  1.3: Executive Pay by Year 
This table show the total executive pay annually over the sample period. Variables are as defined 
in section 1.9. The sample consists of Kuwait non-bank firms over the sample period 2004-2012. 
All figures are in Kuwaiti Dinar 
 
 
  N Mean Median Min Max SD 
2004 21 547.9 399 30 3005.0 671.4 
2005 61 676.4 254 21.53 6338 1099.9 
2006 104 497.5 245.5 21.53 4.127 750.9 
2007 114 684.8 280.3 24 6906 1162.1 
2008 128 554.8 278.8 21.53 6906 1003.8 
2009 129 549.1 280.1 21.53 6906 1030.3 
2010 137 519.9 236.0 21.53 6906 956.0 
2011 134 513.7 278.6 21.53 6906 962.4 
2012 132 494.5 275.6 21.53 6906 910.9 








Table  1.4: Executive Pay by Industry 
This table show the total executive pay by industry. Industry classifications are per the Kuwait 
Stock Exchange‘s during the sample period. Variables are as defined in section 1.9. The sample 





N Mean Median Min Max SD 
Food 43 323.0 266.4 67.18 750.6 200.6 
Industrials 171 428.2 202.1 21.53 6798 873.4 
Insurance 3 120.3 93.95 89.25 177.7 49.76 
Investment 278 728.4 339.6 21.53 6906 1149.0 
Real Estate 168 390.6 316.9 21.53 2022.2 300.6 
Services 297 586.5 217.5 21.53 6.906 1141.1 











Table  1.5: SWF Ownership Over Time 
This table shows the proportion of firms in the Kuwait Stock Exchange ultimately owned by a 






















Table  1.6: Correlation Matrix 
This table shows the correlation between the variables of interest. Variables are as defined in section 1.9. The sample consists of 































        
Tobin’s q 0.281 0.214 1.000 




0.635 0.865 0.009 1.000 
      
Sales 
(millions) 
0.600 0.602 0.071 0.653 1.000 




0.529 0.676 0.280 0.514 0.577 1.000 
    
Leverage 0.169 0.034 -0.093 0.170 0.031 -0.089 1.000 




0.019 -0.007 -0.018 -0.041 -0.015 0.008 0.026 1.000 
  
CCD -0.050 -0.085 -0.136 -0.053 -0.001 -0.045 -0.072 -0.380 1.000 
 







Table  1.7: Pay-Performance Relationship and Ultimate Owner 
This table shows the regression results of change in pay on change on performance and sovereign 
wealth fund ownership. The dependent variable is change in cash pay. The sample consists of 
Kuwait non-bank firms over the sample period 2004-2012. Variables are as defined in section 
1.9. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 















   
(-1.99) 












Δ Net Income 
  
0.005*** 
   
(3.17) 
SWF -25.817 2.121 -11.078 
 
(-1.01) (0.08) (-0.46) 
Market Cap (millions) 0.195*** 0.168*** 0.179*** 
 
(13.28) (6.79) (10.38) 
Tobin’s q 10.436 40.059 30.685 
 
(0.29) (1.51) (1.05) 
Leverage -21.211 -46.919 -32.431 
 
(-0.34) (-0.58) (-0.43) 
_cons -5.672 -47.965 -31.609 
 
(-0.12) (-1.35) (-0.88) 
Obs. 779 773 775 
Adj R-Sq 0.165 0.100 0.239 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 





Table  1.8: Pay-Performance Relationship, Cash Flow Rights, and Ultimate Owner 
This table shows the regression results of change in pay on change on performance and sovereign 
wealth fund cash flow rights. The dependent variable is change in cash pay. The sample consists 
of Kuwait non-bank firms over the sample period 2004-2012. Variables are as defined in section 
1.9. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 












Δ NI*SWF CF Rights 
  
-0.013* 
   
(-1.94) 












Δ NI*CF Rights 
  
-0.005 
   
(-0.96) 












Δ Net Income 
  
0.006** 
   
(2.29) 
Cash Flow Rights 21523 -4612 -17831 
 
(0.38) (-0.09) (-0.36) 
Market Cap (millions) 0.191*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 
 
(15.61) (11.16) (11.21) 
Tobin’s q 7.795 28.774 29.769 
 
(0.25) (1.29) (1.05) 
Leverage -28.295 -40.514 -34.544 
 
(-0.48) (-0.50) (-0.46) 
_cons -6.553 -36.873 -26.050 
 
(-0.13) (-1.03) (-0.67) 
Obs. 779 773 775 
Adj R-Sq 0.164 0.123 0.248 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 





Table  1.9: Pay-Performance Relationship, Ownership Structure, and Ultimate Owner 
This table shows the regression results of change in pay on change on performance and sovereign 
wealth fund control rights cash flow rights divergence. The dependent variable is change in cash 
pay. The sample consists of Kuwait non-bank firms over the sample period 2004-2012. Variables 
are as defined in section 1.9. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 












Δ NI*SWF CCD 
  
0.021 
   
(0.60) 















   
(0.40) 












Δ Net Income 
  
0.004** 
   
(1.25) 
CCD -269.644 -58.886 -105.121 
 
(-1.29) (-0.43) (-1.06) 
Market Cap (millions) 0.157*** 0.165*** 0.169*** 
 
(3.99) (7.78) (12.72) 
Tobin’s q 50.522 39.960 26.653 
 
(1.57) (1.32) (0.85) 
Leverage -33.789 -10.423 -33.072 
 
(-0.43) (-0.11) (-0.44) 
_cons -51.275 -50.399 -21.324 
 
(-1.21) (-1.28) (-0.56) 
Obs. 779 773 775 
Adj R-Sq 0.116 0.104 0.224 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 






Table  1.10: Pay-Performance Relationship and Ultimate Owner Controlling for Other Large 
Shareholders 
This table shows the regression results of change in pay on change on performance and sovereign 
wealth fund ownership. The dependent variable is change in cash pay. The sample consists of 
Kuwait non-bank firms over the sample period 2004-2012. Variables are as defined in section 
1.9. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** 




(1) (2) (3) 















   
(-1.05) 















   
(-0.26) 












Δ Net Income 
  
0.005 
   
(1.25) 
SWF -68.367** -57.838* -72.179* 
 
(-2.11) (-1.67) (-1.95) 
Non-SWF Large Shareholder -51.960 -73.202* -76.057* 
 
(-1.35) (-1.71) (-1.69) 
Market Cap (millions) 0.195*** 0.169*** 0.177*** 
 
(13.93) (7.21) (9.50) 
Tobin’s q 9.005 37.168 28.997 
 
(0.25) (1.41) (0.96) 
Leverage -19.124 -49.449 -40.273 
 
(-0.32) (-0.60) (-0.49) 
_cons 39.970 18.162 37.384 
 
(0.67) (0.32) (0.58) 
Obs. 779 773 775 
Adj R-Sq 0.164 0.101 0.240 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 





Table  1.11: Pay-Performance Relationship and Ultimate Owner: Subsample 
This table shows the regression results of change in pay on change on performance and sovereign wealth fund ownership. The 
dependent variable is change in cash pay. The sample consists of Kuwait non-bank firms over the sample period 2004-2012 with a 
large controlling shareholder. Variables are as defined in section 1.9. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Δ Market Cap*SWF -0.002* 
        
 
(-1.67) 




       
  
(-1.52) 




      
   
(-2.00) 
      
Δ Market Cap*SWF CF 
Rights    
-0.007** 
     
    
(-2.22) 
     
Δ Sales*SWF CF Rights 
    
-0.006*** 
    
     
(-10.54) 
    
Δ NI*SWF CF Rights 
     
-0.012* 
   
      
(-1.75) 
   
Δ Market Cap*SWF CCD 
      
0.017** 
  
       
(2.19) 
  
Δ Sales*SWF CCD 
       
-0.110 
 
        
(-1.51) 
 
Δ NI*SWF CCD 
        
0.022 





Table 1.11 (cont.): Pay-Performance Relationship and Ultimate Owner: Subsample 
 
Obs. 677 673 674 677 673 674 677 673 674 
Adj R-Sq 0.151 0.089 0.251 0.150 0.121 0.264 0.103 0.090 0.234 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table  1.12: Pay-Performance Relationship and Ultimate Owner: KIA Only 
This table shows the regression results of change in pay on change on performance and sovereign wealth fund ownership. The 
dependent variable is change in cash pay. The sample consists of Kuwait non-bank firms over the sample period 2004-2012 with large 
controlling shareholders. Variables are as defined in section 1.9. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Δ Market Cap*KIA -0.002* 
        
 
(-1.80) 




       
  
(-1.53) 




      
   
(-1.98) 
      
Δ Market Cap*KIA CF Rights 
   
-0.008** 
     
    
(-2.58) 
     
Δ Sales*KIA CF Rights 
    
-
0.006***     
     
(-9.48) 
    
Δ NI*KIA CF Rights 
     
-0.013* 
   
      
(-1.93) 
   
Δ Market Cap*KIA CCD 
      
0.013 
  
       
(1.60) 
  
Δ Sales*KIA CCD 
       
-0.114 
 
        
(-1.62) 
 
Δ NI*KIA CCD 
        
0.022 






Table 1.12 (cont.): Pay-Performance Relationship and Ultimate Owner: KIA Only 
 
Obs. 779 773 775 779 773 775 779 773 775 
Adj R-Sq 0.164 0.100 0.239 0.163 0.123 0.248 0.116 0.104 0.224 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table  1.13: Pay-Performance Relationship and Ultimate Owner: KIA Stable Ownership Matched 
Sample 
This table shows the regression results of change in pay on change on performance and sovereign 
wealth fund ownership. The dependent variable is change in cash pay. The sample consists of 
Kuwait non-bank firms with stable KIA ownership over the sample period 2004-2012 and their 
corresponding matches. Matching was done on cash flow rights, market cap, Tobin‘s q, leverage, 
industry, and year as well as on having a stable ownership. Variables are as defined in section 
1.9. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Δ Market Cap*KIA -0.005*** 
     
 
(-6.12) 




    
  
(-2.91) 




   
   
(-3.51) 
   
Δ Market Cap*KIA CF 
Rights    
-0.012* 
  
    
(-1.82) 
  
Δ Sales*KIA CF Rights 
    
-0.037** 
 
     
(-2.10) 
 
Δ NI*KIA CF Rights 
     
-0.034** 
      
(-2.66) 
Obs. 47 50 50 47 50 50 
Adj R-Sq 0.698 0.641 0.716 0.529 0.598 0.668 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table  1.14: Pay-Performance Relationship and Ultimate Owner: Fixed-Effects Model 
This table shows the regression results of change in pay on change on performance and sovereign wealth fund ownership. The 
dependent variable is change in cash pay. The sample consists of Kuwait non-bank firms over the sample period 2004-2012 with large 
controlling shareholders. Variables are as defined in section 1.9. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Δ Market Cap*KIA -0.002* 
        
 
(-1.81) 




       
  
(-1.54) 




      
   
(-1.98) 
      
Δ Market Cap*KIA CF Rights 
   
-0.008** 
     
    
(-2.59) 
     
Δ Sales*KIA CF Rights 
    
-0.006*** 
    
     
(-9.48) 
    
Δ NI*KIA CF Rights 
     
-0.013* 
   
      
(-1.94) 
   
Δ Market Cap*KIA CCD 
      
0.012 
  
       
(1.54) 
  
Δ Sales*KIA CCD 
       
-0.115 
 
        
(-1.64) 
 
Δ NI*KIA CCD 
        
0.021 






Table 1.14 (cont.): Pay-Performance Relationship and Ultimate Owner: Fixed-Effects Model 
 
Obs. 779 773 775 779 773 775 779 773 775 
Adj R-Sq 0.165 0.100 0.239 0.164 0.123 0.248 0.116 0.104 0.224 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





1.9 Variable and Acronym Definitions 
Variable Variable Description 
Cash Pay The salaries and other short-term compensation received by the top 
management team in thousands. 
Market Cap The market capitalization of the firm (in thousands) calculated as 
the stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding in 
millions. 
Tobin’s q Calculated as the market cap of the firm plus its debts divided by 
the book value of assets. 
Total Assets The total assets of the firm. 
Sales Total sales of the firm in thousands. 
Net Income The net income of the firm in thousands. 
Leverage Calculated as the firm‘s debt divided by total assets. 
Cash Flow Rights The product of the ownership levels along the ownership chain of 
the ultimate major shareholder. 
Control Rights The minimum level of ownership in the ownership chain of the 
ultimate major shareholder. 
CCD The difference between the ultimate shareholder‘s control and cash 
flow rights. 
SWF A dummy variable equal to one if the largest ultimate shareholder 
is a SWF, zero otherwise. 
Non-SWF A dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a large controlling 
ultimate shareholder that is not a SWF, zero otherwise. 
KIA A dummy variable equal to one if the largest ultimate shareholder 





 Chapter 2: How Do Dividend Payout Policies Affect a Firm’s Share 
Price? 
2.1 Introduction 
Lintner (1956) found that management is reluctant to reduce regular dividend payout rates 
once they are established, reflecting a tradition of conservatism in raising payout rates. Since that 
seminal work was published, the phenomenon of dividend smoothing—when a firm‘s previous 
period‘s dividend policy acts as a benchmark to its current period‘s dividend policy—has been 
widely researched in various theoretical frameworks. Scholars have examined, both theoretically 
and empirically, a myriad of phenomena associated with dividend smoothing, including the 
factors that influence a firms payout policy (Allen & Michaely, 2003; Kalay and Lemmon, 2008), 
the process through which a firm sets its dividend policy (Berk and DeMarzo, 2007), a firm‘s 
propensity to pay dividends (Leary & Michaely, 2011), and, more recently, whether the level of 
smoothing has an effect on stock prices (Larkin et al., 2017). The knowledge gleaned from this 
research suggests that dividends—unlike share repurchases—are ‗sticky‘ (Allen et al., 2000; 
Arnott et al., 2003; Jo & Pan, 2009). 
Modigliani and Miller (1961) suggested that dividend policy is irrelevant, but their 
analysis assumes an ideal setting whereas empirical evidence suggests that, in a real-world 
setting, management is concerned with both their dividend policies and shareholder reactions to 
those policies. Brav et al. (2005) state that “Eighty-eight percent [of managers] strongly or very 
strongly agree that they consider the level of dividends per share paid in recent quarters when 
choosing today’s dividend policy.” They found that managers expect serious negative 
consequences after reducing dividends and that payout decisions convey critical information 




may forgo potentially lucrative investment opportunities to maintain steady dividend levels. 
Guttman et al. (2010) found that managers maintain dividends from one period to the next 
regardless of changes in earnings. Additionally, Daniel et al. (2010) found that managers are even 
willing to manage earnings upward when they expect actual earnings to fall short of expected 
dividend levels. 
Recently, Larkin et al. (2017) found no statistically substantive relationship between 
dividend smoothing and share price, stating that “Dividend smoothing affects the composition of 
a firm’s shareholders but has little impact on its stock price.” However, the researchers 
commented that their findings were ‗puzzling’ and noted that a great deal of scholarly research 
would be needed to begin to unravel the enigma of dividend smoothing. Larkin et al. (2017) are 
not alone in their depiction of dividend phenomena as puzzling (Black, 1976; D‘Angelo & 
D‘Angelo, 2004). Specifically, there is a great deal of ambiguity surrounding the causes of 
dividend smoothing, which continues to leave scholars puzzled (DeMarzo & Sannikov, 2008; 
Lambrecht & Meyers, 2012). 
The objective of this study is to re-examine and develop insight into dividend smoothing 
by considering the effects of dividend payout and smoothing levels on share prices. I posit that 
the level of dividends smoothed plays a crucial role in affecting a firm‘s share price. This 
assertion is well-supported by the work of Nissim and Ziv (2001) and Arnott and Asness (2003), 
who state, “We find that dividend changes provide information about the level of profitability in 
subsequent years.” I suggest that investors would not place as high a price premium on a firm 
that smooths 0.1% of its net income as they would on a firm that smooths 90% of its income. For 
instance, Berkshire Hathaway should not expect its share price to sell at a premium if it pays out 




Although smoothing does signal strength in future earnings (Chen & Wu, 1999), this 
measure is not sufficient by itself. Both the level of earnings paid out and the level of dividends 
smoothed must be considered because investors would not consider a firm that pays out a small 
percentage of its earnings to be as stable as a similar firm that pays out a larger percentage of its 
earnings. I argue that it would actually be easier for firm A to maintain its low payout level and 
thus have a much lower speed of adjustment (SOA)—a stickier dividend payout policy—than 
firm B if the latter pays out a larger share of its earnings but has to reduce dividends during 
periods of negative growth or uncertain revenue streams. 
Using a dynamic agency model, Lambrecht and Myers (2014) were the first to model the 
link between firm earnings and dividend payouts. Their work suggests that dividend smoothness 
stems mostly from management‘s desire to maximize rents from firms as opposed to reflecting a 
predisposition to smooth dividends because they believe shareholders desire them. Wu‘s (2017) 
model adds that dividends also signal a firm‘s earnings persistence. Wu‘s (2017) model would 
therefore imply that firms that pursue a high-payout, high-smoothing dividend payout policy 
signal the strength and safety of their earnings to investors. Additionally, Karpavičius (2014) 
asserts that firms with stable dividend payouts are considered more valuable by investors. 
Therefore, these firms should sell at a premium compared with their lower-payout, low-
smoothing counterparts. Gordon (1963) and Lintner (1963) devised the bird-in-hand preference 
theory as a counter argument to the Mogidliani and Miller (1961) dividend-irrelevance theory. 
The findings of this paper align more closely with the former. 
To effectively address our contribution to the literature stream, I segment this paper into 
two parts: First, I examine whether or not the level of dividend payout has an effect on a firm‘s 
share price (Section 2.3). Second, I investigate whether or not investors do, in fact, value 




answer the question: Do investors value dividend smoothing firms more highly if they pay out a 
higher portion of their earnings? (Section 2.4). 
My findings suggest that the level of a firm‘s dividend payout does have a clear and 
statistically significant effect on its share price. Firms with higher levels of dividend payout 
command a price premium—and thus incur a lower expected return—than firms with lower 
levels of payout. Investors do value dividend smoothing firms more highly if their payout levels 
are higher. I then revisit the dividend-smoothing argument and find that, by considering the level 
of a firm‘s payout, investors do value high-payout dividend-smoothing firms more highly than 
low-payout dividend-smoothing firms. I do not claim that the results reported in this section fully 
explain the dividend-smoothing puzzle yet, but they do provide encouraging insights and an 
important dimension to be considered in future research in the payout-policy and dividend-
smoothing literatures. Finally, I consider portfolios at the extreme levels of the payout-
smoothness spectrum and find that high-payout firms that pursue high levels of smoothing 
command a premium over low-payout firms that pursue low levels of smoothing. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 explains the data 
findings and measures of dividend smoothing and payout policy; Section 2.3 examines the effects 
of the level of payout on a firm‘s stock returns; Section 2.4 examines the effects of the level of 
payout and the level of smoothing on a firm‘s stock returns. Finally, I offer some concluding 




2.2 Data, Summary Statistics, and Measures of Dividend Smoothing and 
Payout Policy 
2.2.1 Data 
I obtain stock-return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and 
annual fundamental data from Compustat. My analysis period runs from July 1970 through 
December 2018. The details and definitions pertaining to all variables are included in section 
2.8.2 of this paper. Furthermore, I examine only firms that have paid out dividends for at least 10 
years during my sample period, following the sample selection process used in both Leary and 
Michaely (2011) and Larkin et al. (2017). 
The CRSP sample includes NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ securities with CRSP share 
codes of 10 or 11. A firm must have market equity data (price and shares outstanding) for 
December of year t to be included in the CRSP sample for that year. In light of their highly 
regulated nature, I exclude firms from the utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949) and financial (SIC 
codes 6000-6999) industries from both samples. 
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for firms across the various payout quintiles. The 
median payout in each quintile starts at 10.9% in the lowest payout quintile and increases to 
82.9% in the highest payout quintile. The mean and median payouts for the lower-payout-quintile 
firms are very similar but diverge for the higher-quintile firms. This result is intuitive because the 
distribution of payouts ranges from zero to virtually infinity—and is heavily skewed to the right. 
Additionally, the average values of market capitalization, assets, and cash are all higher than the 
median because of large outliers—market capitalization, assets, and cash increase monotonically 
as I move from low-payout to high-payout quintiles, except for the highest-payout quintile. The 





2.2.2 Measures of Dividend Smoothing and Payout Policy 
Lintner (1956) was the first to introduce a smoothing measure that assumes that a firm 
seeks to maintain a target payout ratio. Subsequent scholars have utilized Lintner‘s (1956) model 
in theoretical explanations of various dividend-smoothing behaviors on the part of firms (Allen et 
al., 2010; Brennan & Thakor, 1990; Kumar, 1988). Until recently, few empirical studies have 
tested the effectiveness of Lintner‘s (1956) model. However, Leary and Michaely (2011) tested 
Lintner‘s model utilizing a simulation exercise, in which 1,000 firms were given an SOA 
generated by Lintner‘s (1956) model. The SOA values ranged from 0.1 to 0.5 based on 10, 20, 
and 50 observations per firm. The objective of the research was to determine whether Lintner‘s 
(1956) model could accurately capture a firm‘s true SOA. 
The researchers found that Lintner‘s (1956) SOA measure fails to accurately capture a 
firm‘s true SOA—especially for firms with smoother dividends (low SOA) and those with a low 
number of observations. Instead, they proposed an alternative SOA measure that uses a two-step 
procedure. First, they estimate a firm‘s target payout ratio (TPR) over a 10-year sample period. 
They then observe the firm‘s deviation from the estimated TPR to estimate its SOA   using this 
equation: 
                                                                           
                                                                              
This alternative SOA measure more accurately measures a firm‘s true SOA, and I therefore use it 
in our analysis. 
Leary and Michaely (2011) also devised a new measure of smoothness for firms that 




the volatility of dividends relative to earnings. They fit a quadratic time trend to both dividends 
(split-adjusted) and earnings (scaled and split-adjusted), 
                     
                                              
                          
                                 
and calculate their new smoothness measure, relative volatility or RelVol, as the ratio of the root 
mean squared errors from these two regressions, 
     
     
. 
Leary and Michaely (2011) repeat the same exercise by simulating payout policies in 
firms maintaining specified levels of dividends per share instead of TPRs. A sticky policy is 
therefore one in which dividends remain unchanged as long as earnings stay within a given range, 
and change only if earnings change beyond that specified range. In other words, managers will 
increase dividends only if earnings rise significantly or reduce them only if earnings fall too low 
to be maintained. Leary and Michaely vary the degree of smoothness across 10 samples by 
varying the width of the range where firms keep dividends unchanged. I calculate SOA and 
RelVol for each firm from 1970 through 2018 and winsorize the upper and lower 2.5% of both 
measures for each year.  Figure 1 shows the distribution of SOA and RelVol over my sample 
period. 
I calculate the payout ratio as the aggregate dividends payable to common shareholders 
(D) divided by earnings available for common shareholders (Y). Aggregate dividends payable to 
common shareholders (D) is calculated by multiplying dividends per share (DVPSX_C) by total 
common shares outstanding (CSHO). Earnings available for common shareholders (Y) are 
calculated by taking earnings before extraordinary items (IB) minus preferred dividends (DVP) 




excessively high payout ratios, those that pay out dividends while having near-zero earnings, I 
winsorize the upper 95% of a payout by replacing it with the 95
th
 percentile value of the payout in 
that year. To demonstrate robustness, I conducted the same tests with a measure of payout as a 
percentage of a cash-based measure of profits (Ball et al. 2016), which leads to a similar 
conclusion. I chose this payout definition because it is the most intuitive and because it most 
accurately measures the effort management puts into maintaining payout policies. I oppose using 
the dividend-yield measure (dividends/market-equity) because, as I am testing the impacts 
varying payout policies have on share prices, I cannot accurately measure this impact by 
including stock prices in the denominator of my measure. Lagging the denominator will not 
resolve this issue either. 
2.3 The Effects of the Level of Payouts on Firm Stock Returns 
Larkin et al. (2017) ultimately conclude that there was “No detectable relation between 
dividend smoothing and prices or cost of equity capital.” Yet in the face of overwhelming 
evidence that both management and shareholders prefer and strongly encourage dividend 
smoothing among firms (Allen & Michaely, 2003; Arnott & Asness, 2003; Brennan & Thakor, 
1990; Larkin et al., 2017) and that managers anticipate large market penalties for omitting or 
adjusting dividends downward (Brav et al. 2005), I also find this conclusion to be puzzling. 
To better address this seemingly conflicting view, I suggest that smoothness on its own 
does not suffice to enable a firm to command a price premium. Instead, smoothness and the level 
of payout must both be considered if a firm hopes to command a price premium.  In other words, 
investors should not be expected to place as high a price premium on a firm that smooths 0.1% of 




earns $1,000 should not expect to enjoy a high price premium for its stock by distributing 1 cent 
in dividends—no matter how smooth that cent might be. Therefore, I test the null hypothesis: 
H1: The level of a firm’s payout has no effect on its share price 
To test this, I observe firms that have a positive dividend payout in each year and segment 
firms into five quintiles ranging from low-payout to high-payout firms and observe variation in 
returns over the following year. In the next section, I describe the methodology behind the 
construction of these portfolios. 
2.3.1 Methodology  
2.3.1.1 Methodology Aggregate 
I start by using all firms listed in both the Compustat and CRSP databases for the 1970–
2018 period. I then develop three procedures to i) generate breakpoints, ii) form portfolios, and 
iii) calculate returns. 
i) Generating Breakpoints 
To generate appropriate breakpoints, I follow Fama-French (2015) and use only NYSE 
stocks to generate breakpoints so that small-cap stocks, which make up a disproportionately large 
number of firms in the investable universe compared to the amount of dividends they pay to the 
market as a whole, exert little influence over fluctuations in the breakpoints. 
Over the sample period, I include only companies that I can identify as having paid a 
positive dividend in each year—in both the CRSP and Compustat databases. For each year, I sort 
companies along a scale running from the lowest to the highest payout ratios and separate stocks 
into five payout groups running from Q1 (the lowest 20% of payouts) to Q5 (the highest 20% of 
payouts). I must nevertheless still account for firms that pay out dividends despite having 




In my view, companies that carry a positive payout ratio use current-year proceeds (primarily) to 
distribute dividends. On the other hand, negative payout firms use future years‘ proceeds to pay 
out dividends; this makes them the highest of all payout firms in each year. I also winsorize the 
highest payout firms to 95%—by replacing those values with the 95
th
 percentile value. These are 
firms that maintain their dividend payout policies despite having close to zero earnings. In so 
doing, I avoid the unnecessary fluctuation effects these firms would have on our results. 
 
ii) Forming Portfolios 
To form portfolios I include the entire sample of stocks from the NYSE, the AMEX, and 
NASDAQ from both CRSP and Compustat with share codes 10 or 11. At the end of June of each 
year t, stocks are allocated to one of the five payout (PO) groups based on the data generated 
through December of year t-1. I allocate the sampling data to their respective payout quintiles 
using the NYSE payout breakpoints formed in part ―3.1.1-i.‖ 
iii) Calculating Returns 
After I establish our five portfolios of stocks sorted into PO groups, I invest in each of the 
five quintile portfolios for one year from June of year t through May of year t+1 and then repeat 
the same procedure with the new data gained over that period. I measure returns on each portfolio 
as the average monthly returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate (taken from Ken 
French‘s data library). I repeat this process every year from June of 1970 through December 
2018. 
iv) High-Minus-Low Payout-Portfolio Calculation 
I calculate the aggregate of the high-payout (Q5) quintile minus the aggregate of the low-
payout (Q1) quintile for each year (Tables 2.2a, 2.3 & 2.4 and Figure 2.2) to ensure that no one 




2.3.1.2 Methodology per Industry 
i) Generating Breakpoints 
As is the case with the aggregate method described above, I consider dividend-paying 
stocks listed on the NYSE. For each year, I sort companies from the lowest to the highest payout 
ratios in each of five industries based on their four-digit SIC codes and break stocks into five 
payout groups ranging from Q1 (the lowest 20%) to Q5 (the highest 20%) of PO per industry per 
year. The five industries used are Consumer Durables, Manufacturing, High Tech, Healthcare, 
and Others. I assign firms that have negative payout ratios the same value as the highest payout 
firm in their respective industries, and I then winsorize the highest payout firms to 95% to reduce 
fluctuations in payout results stemming from these industries.  
ii) Forming Portfolios 
I use the entire sample of stocks from the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ on both 
CRSP and Compustat with share codes 10 or 11. At the end of each June of year t, stocks are 
allocated to the five PO quintiles by reference to their respective industries based on the data 
generated from year t-1 and using NYSE PO breakpoints for each year. This yields a 5x5 matrix 
of portfolios based on level of payout and 4-digit SIC industry code. The portfolios are invested 





iii) Calculating Returns 
Once portfolios are created from the five industries, I sort them by level of payout. 
Subsequently, I invest in each of the 5x5 portfolios for a year from June of year t through May of 
year t+1, and then repeat the same procedure with the new data gained over period t+1. I measure 
returns on each portfolio as the average monthly returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill 
rate (taken from Ken French‘s data library). I repeat this process every year from June of 1970 
through December 2018. 
2.3.2 Results 
Table 2.2a shows the monthly excess returns on five portfolios formed by level of payout 
as constructed in section 2.3.1.1. 
  Firms that command a price premium see their shares bid up at time t while their peers do 
not, and as a result they earn lower future returns. I see that there is a clear gradient in excess 
returns, which decrease as I move from low-payout firms (Q1) to high-payout firms (Q5). This 
suggests that firms that have higher payout ratios command price premiums over firms that have 
lower payout ratios. 
I have segmented Q5 into two parts: the Q5a bucket includes companies with the highest 
positive payout ratios while Q5b includes companies with negative payout ratios (those that pay 
out dividends despite having negative earnings). 
To ensure that this analysis is not influenced by any one specific industry, I repeat the 
same procedure for each of the five industries—as per section 3.1.2—and report the results in 
Table 2.2b. 
  I observe that the gradient persists in all five industries. Although the gradient of excess 




similar patterns. Therefore, I can conclude that the gradient in excess returns is not being 
influenced by any one industry. 
I then investigate whether these excess returns can be explained by the Fama-French 
factors, using both the 3-factor and 5-factor models. Using the aggregate portfolios (Table 2.2a), I 
calculate the intercepts (alphas) of each portfolio over the sample period. Table 2.3 below shows 
the Fama-French 3-factor (Fama & French, 1993) intercepts for each of the six payout portfolios. 
The results reported in this table clearly illustrate that the excess returns generated by payouts are 
not explained by the Fama-French factors. 
Table 2.3 illustrates that the intercepts still have clear and significant gradients, and the 
intercept of the high-low payout portfolios (HML) is negative and statistically significant. This 
indicates that the price premiums that high-payout firms command over lower-payout firms 
cannot be explained by the Fama-French 3 factors. 
Fama-French‘s 3-factor model uses market variables to explain returns. The Fama-French 
5-factor model adds accounting data for profitability (‗RMW‘) and investment (‗CMA‘) factors. 
Both of these new factors are highly related to payout decisions (Fama & French, 2015), which 
may more accurately explain the variation in excess returns. As indicated by the results reported 
in Table 2.4, the 5-factor model is able to explain much, but not all, of the variation in excess 
returns. 
This indicates that even the RMW and CMA factors, which are closely related to payout 
decisions, are unable to fully explain the variation in excess returns on my portfolios; the 
intercepts (alphas) still have a clear and significant gradient. 
The results reported in Table 2.4 show that the intercepts generated from the portfolios I 
constructed still display a gradient of high alphas (low price premiums) for the low-payout 




the high-minus-low payout portfolio remains negative and statistically significant, indicating that 
the premium that high-payout firms command over lower-payout firms cannot be explained by 
the 5-factor model. I can suggest two possible explanations for this phenomenon. The first 
possible explanation involves the bird-in-hand preference of the dividend policy proposed by 
Gordon (1963) and Lintner (1962), as opposed to Modigliani and Miller‘s dividend irrelevance 
theory of 1961. The second possible explanation is the signaling theory, wherein high-payout 
firms signal earnings strength and persistence (Nissim and Ziv, 2001; Arnott and Asness 2003; 
Wu 2017). 
To test the extremes of these results, I construct a long–short portfolio by going long on 
low-payout firms and short on high-payout firms and follow its performance over the sample 
period. Figure 2 illustrates the cumulative returns of that portfolio over the sample period. 
I see that the strategy performs well throughout our sample period, generating a near 
tenfold cumulative return on the long–short investment strategy. The shaded region indicates 
periods of recession. The portfolio performs consistently well even through periods of recession, 
except for the unusual movement in the Great Recession of 2008. 
Given the above analysis, I reject the null hypothesis that a firm‘s level of payout has no 
effect on its price. I find that the level of a firm‘s dividend payout does have a clear and 
significant effect on price. A portfolio of firms with high payout ratios experiences significantly 
lower returns than a portfolio of firms with lower payout ratios, indicating that investors value 
firms differently based on their respective levels of payout—insofar as they place a price 
premium on firms with higher payout ratios over firms with lower payout ratios. 
My conclusion is further reinforced by the three Fama-MacBeth (1973) robustness 




2.4 The Effects of the Level of Payout and the Level of Smoothness on 
Returns 
After concluding that the level of a firm‘s payout does have an effect on its share price, I 
wanted to revisit Larkin et al.‘s (2017) test to determine whether investors value dividend- 
smoothing stocks differently, given a firm‘s level of payout. I therefore investigate this question 
by testing differences in the price premiums that investors are willing to pay for firms based on 
level of payout.  I hypothesize: 
H2: Investors value dividend-smoothing firms more highly if those firms pay out higher 
portions of their earnings 
Larkin et al. (2017) showed that smoothing companies do not command premiums. They 
observed that excess returns on high-minus-low-smoothing portfolios are not significantly 
different from zero. I obtain the same results, which I show in the pooled alpha row of Tables 2.8 
Panel A and 2.9 Panel A. 
I posit that the conclusion that Larkin et al. (2017) reach depends on their comparing 
smoothing firms only in aggregate and without considering the effects of levels of payout in their 
analysis. To test my hypothesis, I segment dividend-smoothing companies by both level of 
payout and level of smoothness, and then form portfolios accordingly and observe firm 
performance. My results thereby illustrate a more holistic depiction of the phenomenon. 
2.4.1 Methodology 
In this section, I describe the methodology behind the construction of the portfolios. 
I divide this analysis into three steps: First, I calculate the measures of smoothing—SOA 




smoothing). Third, I form portfolios based on levels of both payouts and smoothing. Finally, I 
present the findings in suitable tables and figures. 
First, I construct the measures of SOA and RelVol as described in section 2.2.3. Second, 
taking only companies listed on the NYSE, I sort each company that measures SOA and list them 
from the lowest (high smoothing) to the highest (low smoothing) in each year t-1. I generate two 
breakpoints at the 30
th
 percentile and the 70
th
 percentile and use these breakpoints to form three 
portfolios in year t based on a firm‘s level of dividend smoothing. I repeat the same procedure for 
RelVol. 
Third, I use the entire sample of stocks from the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ on 
both CRSP and Compustat with share codes 10 or 11. At the beginning of June of each year t, 
stocks are allocated to one of the 5x3 portfolios depending on their t-1 levels of payout and 
smoothing. The payout breakpoints are generated independently using only NYSE companies, 
following the same procedure as I followed in section 2.3.1. After I create our 5x3 portfolios of 
stocks, I invest in them for a year from June of year t through May of year     and I then repeat 
the same procedure with the data gained over that period. I measure returns on each portfolio as 
the average monthly returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate (taken from Ken 
French‘s data library). I repeat this process every year from June of 1970 through December 
2018. 
Finally, I present the findings in three main tables: The results reported in Tables 2.5 and 
2.6 show the excess returns on the portfolios using SOA and RelVol as dividend-smoothing 
measures, respectively. Table 2.8 Panel A and Table 2.9 Panel A show the Fama-French 5-factor 
intercepts (the alphas) for excess returns on 15 portfolios formed by PO and SOA/RelVol, 
respectively. Results reported in Panel B in both Tables 2.8 and 2.9 show the factor betas, t-stats, 
R
2




factor betas of the difference between a portfolio of high-minus-low-payout firms and a portfolio 
of high-minus-low-smoothing firms. Finally, by taking the extreme portfolios on the payout and 
smoothness spectrum, the results reported in Table 2.11 show the intercept and factor betas of 
high-payout, high-minus-low-payout, low-smoothing portfolios. In this way I test for the level of 
smoothing as well as the level of payout. 
2.4.2 Results  
In Tables 2.5 and 2.6 I present the excess returns of the 5x3 portfolios formed using level 
of smoothing and level of payout. Q1 contains all the low-payout firms and Q5 contains the high-
payout firms. Q5b is a bucket containing all the negative-payout firms. 
  As illustrated above, there is still a gradient of excess returns running from the low-payout 
firms to the high-payout firms. The gradient is present in each smoothing tercile and in both 
smoothing measures, SOA (Table 2.5) and RelVol (Table 2.6). 
Table 2.7 presents the summary statistics for the extreme buckets in both measures of 
smoothness: the low-payout (Q1), low-smoothness (high SOA or RelVol) bucket and the high-
payout (Q5), high-smoothness (low SOA or RelVol) bucket. 
The median payout ratios in the low-PO, high-SOA bucket and low-PO, high-RelVol 
bucket are similar. The ROEs for firms in the SOA and RelVol buckets are also similar. The main 
difference between firms in the SOA analysis compared with those in the RelVol analysis is that, 
under SOA, firms with a low PO have a smaller market cap, lower assets, and less cash than 
firms with a high PO. Under the RelVol measure of smoothness, low-PO firms and high-PO 
firms both have similar levels of market cap, assets, and cash. Even though the SOA and RelVol 




2.11 are consistent with both measures of smoothness, in that the intercept remains negative and 
mostly significant. 
Next, I test how much of the excess returns reported in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 can be 
explained by the Fama-French 5-factor model. Table 2.8 Panel A shows the intercepts (alphas) 
from excess returns of the 15 portfolios formed by levels of PO and SOA. The results reported in 
Table 2.9 Panel A show the same effects, but for portfolios formed by levels of PO and RelVol. 
The final row, labeled ‗Pooled Alphas,‘ reflects a test similar to the one that Larkin et al. (2017) 
conducted—taking the firms in aggregate based on their levels of smoothness. Larkin et al. 
(2017) find that the high-minus-low-smoothness portfolio alphas are nearly zero and 
insignificant, and so do I. When I consider the level of payout, however, I see a clearer picture of 
how investors value dividend-smoothing firms. 
To test whether smoothness has a clearer effect after considering the level of payout, I 
conduct my test in two steps. First, I calculate the 5-factor alpha of portfolios that go long on a 
portfolio of high-smoothing firms and short on a portfolio of low-smoothing firms within each 
payout quintile, as displayed in Table 2.8 Panel A and Table 2.9 Panel A. I was able to replicate 
Larkin et al.‘s (2017) results, which I see in the ―Pooled Alpha‖ row of Tables 2.8 Panel A and 
2.9 Panel A. When pooling payout firms together I see that a portfolio of high-smoothing firms 
(Low SOA/RelVol) do not command a price premium over a portfolio of low-smoothing firms 
(High SOA/RelVol). I observe the same results. I take this a step further and note that high-
smoothing firms fail to command a statistically significant price premium in nearly all the payout 
quintiles. 
I next, however, want to test whether investors value dividend payers more highly as their 
payout ratios rise. To do this, I observe the difference-in-differences between portfolios 




Considering payout quintiles individually I see that there is an observable increase in the high-
minus-low-smoothing premium as I move from low-payout firms (Q1) to high-payout firms (Q5). 
I find, however, that investors do value high-payout, dividend-smoothing firms more highly than 
low-payout dividend smoothers. This is depicted by the clear and significant difference between 
the alphas of the Q5–Q1 portfolios reported in the ―High minus Low‖ column in Table 2.8 Panel 
A and Table 2.9 Panel A. I display the details on these difference-in-differences intercepts in 
Table 2.10 for both equally weighted and value-weighted portfolios. Intercepts for the equally 
weighted portfolios are notably clearer than those for the value-weighted portfolios. I think this is 
because the market‘s larger firms in any given year do not typically fall into the high- or low-
payout quintiles. 
Although these findings do not violate the main results of this paper, I note that the 
dampened findings pertaining to the value-weighted portfolios are worthy of further exploration, 
which I leave to future endeavors. This includes investigating the characteristics of high- and 
low-payout firms and determining how these firm characteristics influence payout policies. 
To test the extremes of these results, I construct a long–short portfolio of low-payout, 
low-smoothness firms minus high-payout, high-smoothness firms and follow its performance 
over our sample period, as shown in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. 
I conduct an additional robustness test on the results by considering the performance of a 
long–short portfolio of high-payout, high-smoothing companies minus low-payout, low-
smoothing companies. I find that both portfolios have negative and significant alphas under both 
the SOA and RelVol smoothness measures, even after controlling for the Fama-French 5-factor 






Larkin et al. (2017) find that investors do not value firms that smooth their dividends any 
more highly than they value those that do not smooth their dividends. In aggregate, their analysis 
is correct. I nevertheless posit that the level of payout plays an important role in whether or not 
investors are willing to place a price premium on a stock. In aggregate, I find the same results as 
Larkin et al. (2017), namely that high-smoothing firms (those with low SOAs or RelVols) do not 
command a premium over their low-smoothing counterparts. When I include the level of payout 
in the analysis, however, I find that high-payout, high-smoothing firms do command a premium 
over low-payout, low-smoothing firms. Finally, I take our analysis a step further by following 
the performance of extreme portfolios on the payout and smoothness spectrum. I construct a 
portfolio of high-payout, high-smoothing minus low-payout, low-smoothing firms, which 
experiences a clear and significant negative performance over our sample period. This premium 
is not explained by the Fama-French 5-factor or Carhart momentum-factor models (Table 2.11) 





Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
In this table I report the summary statistics for portfolios formed by payout ratios from low-payout to high-payout quintiles. Payout 
quintiles are formed annually by data generated from NYSE stocks only. Firms are listed from the highest to the lowest payouts and 
breakpoints are generated accordingly. Negative-payout-ratio firms are considered the highest payout firms. I apply these breakpoints 
to all firms listed on the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ in each year and present the average market capitalization, total assets, 
cash, ROE, and PO for each quintile portfolio. The table also shows the total firm-month observations in my sample data. 
 
 
  Low Payout Q2 Q3 Q4 High Payout 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Market Cap * $2.622 $230 $4.405 $361 $6.434 $496 $8.157 $474 $3.902 $188 
Total Assets * $2.153 $255 $3.384 $368 $4.907 $526 $6.370 $494 $3.828 $230 
Cash * $182 $14 $280 $20 $406 $26 $545 $28 $296 $14 
ROE .140 .140 .150 .140 .150 .129 .129 .119 .090 .079 
PO .119 .119 .230 .230 .340 .319 .529 .479 5.389 .860 
N 138.633 123.656 111.575 109.299 66.166 
* Market Cap, Total Assets, and Cash in Millions 







Table :  2.2a Excess Returns on Five Portfolios based on Payout 
 
In this table I report the average monthly excess returns on portfolios formed by payout from July 
1970 through December 2018. Excess returns are average returns generated by each portfolio 
minus the risk-free rates of the respective periods. I calculate payouts as aggregate dividends 
payable to common shareholders (D) by earnings available for common shareholders (Y). 
Aggregate dividends (D) are calculated by multiplying dividends per share (DVPSX_C) by total 
common shares outstanding (CSHO). Earnings available for common shareholders (Y) are 
calculated by taking earnings before extraordinary items (IB) minus preferred dividends (DVP) 
plus income-statement deferred tax (TXDI). Payout quintiles are formed annually by data 
generated using NYSE stocks only. Firms are listed from the highest to the lowest payout and 
breakpoints are generated accordingly. Negative-payout-ratio firms are considered the highest 
payout firms and placed in a separate bucket. I apply these breakpoints to all firms listed on the 


















Table: 2.2b Excess Returns on Five Portfolios Based on Payout for each Industry 
 
In this table I report the average monthly excess returns on portfolios formed by payout from July 
1970 through December 2018. Excess returns are the average returns generated by each portfolio 
minus the risk-free rates of the respective periods. I calculate payouts as aggregate dividends 
payable to common shareholders (D) by earnings available for common shareholders (Y). 
Aggregate dividends (D) are calculated by multiplying dividends per share (DVPSX_C) by total 
common shares outstanding (CSHO). Earnings available for common shareholders (Y) are 
calculated by taking earnings before extraordinary items (IB) minus preferred dividends (DVP) 
plus income-statement deferred tax (TXDI). Payout quintiles are formed annually by data 
generated using NYSE stocks only. Firms are listed from the highest to the lowest payout and 
breakpoints are generated accordingly. Negative-payout-ratio firms are considered the highest 
payout firms and placed in a separate bucket. I also segment firms into their respective industries 
using a four-digit SIC code for each year, taken from Ken French‘s data library. I apply these 
breakpoints to all firms listed on the NYSE, the AMEX and NASDAQ in each year and present 
the average annual excess returns on each portfolio. 
 
 
  R-Rf 
Payout Quintile Consumer Manufacturing Technology Health Other 
Q0 .81% .85% 1.25% 1.24% .91% 
Q1 1.26% 1.10% 1.20% 1.20% 1.13% 
Q2 .94% .93% .98% 1.20% 1.11% 
Q3 .96% .98% .98% 1.21% .89% 
Q4 .73% .72% 1.10% .66% .98% 
Q5a .49% .52% .89% .85% .82% 







Table 2.3: FF3 Factor Intercepts of Excess Returns on the Six Portfolios Formed by PO 
In this table I report the Fama-French 3-factor intercepts of portfolios formed by payout from 
July 1970 through December 2018. The intercept is the average of the intercepts for each 
portfolio in each year. It represents the part of the returns on the portfolios that is not explained 
by the Fama-French 3 factors; Market (Rm-Rf), Size (SMB) and Book-to-market ratio (HML). I 
calculate payout as aggregate dividends payable to common shareholders (D) by earnings 
available for common shareholders (Y). Aggregate dividends (D) are calculated by multiplying 
dividends per share (DVPSX_C) by total common shares outstanding (CSHO). Earnings 
available for common shareholders (Y) are calculated by taking earnings before extraordinary 
items (IB) minus preferred dividends (DVP) plus income-statement deferred tax (TXDI). Payout 
quintiles are formed annually by data generated using NYSE stocks only. Firms are listed from 
the highest to lowest payout and breakpoints are generated accordingly. Negative payout ratio 
firms are considered the highest payout firms and placed in a separate bucket. I apply these 
breakpoints to all firms listed on the NYSE, the AMEX and NASDAQ in each year and present 
the average annual excess returns on each portfolio. 
 
                                   
 
 
Payout Quintile 3 Factor Alpha 
Q0 0.132 
t( ) (1.255) 
Q1 0.218*** 
t( ) (3.015) 
Q2 0.159** 
t( ) (2.321) 
Q3 0.107* 
t( ) (1.720) 
Q4 0.124** 
t( ) (2.153) 
Q5a -0.056 
t( ) (-0.810) 
Q5b (Negative PO)  -0.404*** 
t( ) (-3.303) 
Q5-Q1 -0.275*** 








Table 2.4: FF 5 Factor Intercepts from Excess Returns for Six Portfolios Formed by PO 
In this table I report the Fama-French 5-factor intercepts of portfolios formed by payout from 
July 1970 through December 2018. The intercepts are the averages of the intercepts for each 
portfolio in each year. They represent the part of return of the portfolios that is not explained by 
the Fama-French 5 factors; Market (Rm-Rf), Size (SMB), Book-to-market ratio (HML), 
Profitability (RMW), and Investments (CMA). I calculate payouts as aggregate dividends payable 
to common shareholders (D) by earnings available for common shareholders (Y). Aggregate 
dividends (D) are calculated by multiplying dividends per share (DVPSX_C) by total common 
shares outstanding (CSHO). Earnings available for common shareholders (Y) are calculated by 
taking earnings before extraordinary items (IB) minus preferred dividends (DVP) plus income-
statement deferred tax (TXDI). Payout quintiles are formed annually by data generated using 
NYSE stocks only. Firms are listed from the highest to the lowest payout and breakpoints are 
generated accordingly. Negative-payout-ratio firms are considered the highest payout firms and 
placed in a separate bucket. I apply these breakpoints to all firms listed on the NYSE, the AMEX 
and NASDAQ in each year and present the average annual excess returns on each portfolio. 
 
                                               
 
 
Payout Quintile 5 Factor Alpha 
Q0 0.254** 
t( ) (2.390) 
Q1 0.069 
t( ) (1.098) 
Q2 -0.052 
t( ) (-0.950) 
Q3 -0.066 
t( ) (-1.236) 
Q4 -0.051 
t( ) (-1.025) 
Q5a -0.198*** 
t( ) (-2.922) 
Q5b (Negative PO)  -0.473*** 
t( ) (-3.778) 
Q5-Q1 -0.267*** 





Table 2.5: Excess Returns on 5x3 Portfolios Formed on Payout and SOA Quintiles 
 
In this table I report the average monthly excess returns on portfolios formed by payout and the 
speed of adjustment (SOA) measure of stickiness from July 1970 through December 2018. 
Excess returns are the returns generated by each portfolio minus the risk-free rates of the 
respective periods. I calculate payouts as aggregate dividends payable to common shareholders 
(D) by earnings available for common shareholders (Y). Aggregate dividends (D) are calculated 
by multiplying dividends per share (DVPSX_C) by total common shares outstanding (CSHO). 
Earnings available for common shareholders (Y) are calculated by taking earnings before 
extraordinary items (IB) minus preferred dividends (DVP) plus income-statement deferred tax 
(TXDI). SOA is calculated by a two-step procedure. First I estimate a target payout ratio (TPR) 
as the firm median payout ratio over the sample period. Using that estimated target, I construct an 
explicit deviation from the target for each period (   ) and then estimate the SOA as β from the 
following regression:                    where                     . In each 
year breakpoints for High and Low SOA are generated using data from NYSE firms only. Low 
and High SOA firms are those who lie below the 30
th
 percentile and above the 70
th
 percentile 
breakpoints for SOA in each year, respectively. The remaining 40% fall into the Med portfolio. 
Payout quintiles are formed annually by data generated using NYSE stocks only. Firms are listed 
from the highest to the lowest payout and breakpoints are generated accordingly. Negative-
payout-ratio firms are considered the highest payout firms and placed in a separate bucket. I 
apply these breakpoints to all firms listed on the NYSE, the AMEX and NASDAQ in each year 
and present the average annual excess returns on each portfolio. 
 
  SOA 
Payout High Med Low 
Q1 1.01% 1.02% 1.04% 
Q2 .89% .98% 1.01% 
Q3 .82% .92% .81% 
Q4 .77% .78% .78% 
Q5a .77% .77% .83% 








Table 2.6: Excess Returns on 5x3 Portfolios Formed on Payout and RelVol Quintiles 
 
In this table I report the average monthly excess returns on portfolios formed by payout and the 
Relative Volatility (RelVol) measure of stickiness from July 1970 through December 2018. 
Excess returns are returns generated by each portfolio minus the risk-free rates of the respective 
periods. I calculate payouts as aggregate dividends payable to common shareholders (D) by 
earnings available for common shareholders (Y). Aggregate dividends (D) are calculated by 
multiplying dividends per share (DVPSX_C) by total common shares outstanding (CSHO). 
Earnings available for common shareholders (Y) are calculated by taking earnings before 
extraordinary items (IB) minus preferred dividends (DVP) plus income-statement deferred tax 
(TXDI). RelVol is the ratio of the root mean squared errors from these two equations:  
 
                     
      and                           




        
    
    
.  
 
In each year breakpoints for High and Low RelVol are generated using data from NYSE firms 
only. Low and High RelVol firms are those who lie below the 30
th
 percentile and above the 70
th
 
percentile breakpoints for RelVol in each year, respectively. The remaining 40% fall into the 
Med portfolio. Payout quintiles are formed annually by data generated using NYSE stocks only. 
Firms are listed from the highest to the lowest payout and breakpoints are generated accordingly. 
Negative-payout-ratio firms are considered the highest payout firms and placed in a separate 
bucket. I apply these breakpoints to all firms listed on the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ in 





Payout High Med Low 
Q1 1.08% .99% 1.13% 
Q2 .89% .91% 1.03% 
Q3 .90% .88% .81% 
Q4 .75% .87% .76% 
Q5a .88% .70% .75% 






Table 2.7: Summary Statistics on Payout and Stickiness 
In this table I report the summary statistics for the extreme portfolios by stickiness and payout. I 
show the average market capitalization, total assets, cash, ROE, and PO for the respective 
quintiles. I also show the total firm-month observation in our sample data. In each year 
breakpoints for High and Low SOA/RelVol are generated using data from NYSE firms only. 
Low and High SOA/RelVol firms are those that lie below the 30
th
 percentile and above the 70
th
 
percentile breakpoints in each year, respectively. Similarly, breakpoints for High and Low Payout 
are generated using data from NYSE firms only. Low and High Payout firms are those that lie 
below the 20
th
 percentile and above the 80
th
 percentile breakpoints in each year, respectively. I 
apply these breakpoints to all firms listed on the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ in each year 
and present the summary statistics for each portfolio below. 
 
 
  Low Payout High SOA High Payout Low SOA 
  Mean Median Mean Median 
Market Cap (Millions) $2.356 $390 $6.943 $456 
Total Assets (Millions) $2.117 $442 $4.585 $412 
Cash (Millions) $178 $25 $533 $29 
ROE .129 .129 .150 .119 
PO .109 .109 8.020 .769 
N 24.798 14.011 
 
Low Payout High RelVol High Payout Low RelVol 
  Mean Median Mean Median 
Market Cap (Millions) $3.615 $309 $4.231 $293 
Total Assets (Millions) $2.920,3 $375,6 $3.151,0 $280,4 
Cash (Millions) $262,3 $23,0 $282,9 $19,6 
ROE .129 .140 .140 .100 
PO .119 .119 2.839 .879 






Table 2.8 – Panel A: FF 5-Factor Intercepts from Excess Returns for 15 Portfolios 
Formed by PO and SOA: July 1970 through Dec 2018 
 
In this table I report the Fama-French 5-factor intercepts of portfolios formed by payout and the 
speed of adjustment (SOA) measure of stickiness from July 1970 through December 2018. 
Intercepts are the average intercepts for each portfolio in each year. They represent the part of the 
return on the portfolios that is not explained by the Fama-French 5 factors: Market (Rm-Rf), Size 
(SMB), Book-to-market ratio (HML), Profitability (RMW), and Investments (CMA). I calculate 
payouts as aggregate dividends payable to common shareholders (D) by earnings available for 
common shareholders (Y). Aggregate dividends (D) are calculated by multiplying dividends per 
share (DVPSX_C) by total common shares outstanding (CSHO). Earnings available for common 
shareholders (Y) are calculated by taking earnings before extraordinary items (IB) minus 
preferred dividends (DVP) plus income-statement deferred tax (TXDI). SOA is calculated by a 
two-step procedure. First I estimate a target payout ratio (TPR) as the firm median payout ratio 
over a 10-year period. Using that estimated target, I construct an explicit deviation from the target 
for each period (   ) and then estimate the SOA as β from the following regression:         
            where                     . In each year breakpoints for High and Low 
SOA are generated using data from NYSE firms only. Low and High SOA firms are those that lie 
below the 30
th
 percentile and above the 70
th
 percentile breakpoints for SOA in each year, 
respectively. The remaining 40% fall into the Med portfolio. Payout quintiles are formed 
annually by data generated using NYSE stocks only. Firms are listed from the highest to the 
lowest payout and breakpoints are generated accordingly. The ―Pooled Alpha‖ row shows the 
aggregate alphas for a portfolio containing all payout firms in each SOA tercile. Negative-
payout-ratio firms are considered the highest payout firms and placed in a separate bucket. I 
apply these breakpoints to all firms listed on the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ in each year 
and present the average Fama-French 5-factor intercepts for each portfolio. 
                                               
 
  SOA   
Payout Quintile High Med Low High minus Low 
 
  
Q1 -.038% .164% .109% .148% 
t( ) (-.436) (1.977)** (1.195) (1.323) 
Q2 -.057% -.013% -.127% -.069% 
t( ) (-.794) (-.192) (-1.569) (-.750) 
Q3 -.036% -.083% -.189% -.153% 
t( ) (-.577) (-1.175) (-2.129)** (-1.618) 
Q4 -.098% -.144% -.047% .050% 
t( ) (-1.616) (-2.057)** (-.669) (.637) 
Q5a -.067% -.337% -.202% -.135% 
t( ) (-.606) (-3.282)*** (-1.814)* (-.912) 
Q5b (Negative PO)  -.305% -.479% -.516% -.252% 
t( ) (-1.079) (-2.683)*** (-3.001)*** (-.805) 
Q5-Q1 -.101% -.636% -.408% -.307% 
t( ) (-.792) (-5.677)*** (-3.394)*** (-1.967)** 
     Pooled Alpha .31% .272% .262% -.048% 





     Table 2.8 – Panel B: Regressions of Excess Stock Returns on 15 Portfolios Formed by PO and 
SOA on the Fama-French 5 factors: July 1970 thorugh Dec. 2018 
 
                                               
 
  SOA 
Payout Quintile High Med Low 
 





Q1 1.105*** 1.091*** 1.074*** 
 
51.946 54.333 48.394 
Q2 1.031*** 1.034*** 1.041*** 
 
58.666 62.138 52.978 
Q3 0.997*** 1.038*** 1.063*** 
 
65.069 60.288 49.426 
Q4 0.962*** 0.963*** 0.948*** 
 
65.584 56.738 54.908 
Q5a 0.939*** 1.013*** 1.027*** 
 
35.119 40.837 38.153 
Q5b (Negative PO)  1.079*** 1.177*** 1.167*** 
 
15.786 27.320 28.101 
 





Q1 0.616*** 0.675*** 0.681*** 
 
20.225 23.457 21.423 
Q2 0.444*** 0.612*** 0.739*** 
 
17.613 25.693 26.249 
Q3 0.365*** 0.675*** 0.681*** 
 
20.225 23.457 18.867 
Q4 0.329*** 0.612*** 0.739*** 
 
17.613 25.693 19.864 
Q5a 0.317*** 0.535*** 0.581*** 
 
16.643 21.679 16.302 
Q5b (Negative PO)  0.939*** 0.466*** 0.491*** 
 
15.627 19.176 15.269 





Q1 0.036 0.238*** 0.275*** 
 
0.894 6.182 6.455 
Q2 0.144*** 0.246*** 0.250*** 
 
4.258 7.690 6.616 
Q3 0.170*** 0.331*** 0.367*** 
 
5.771 10.013 8.898 
Q4 0.120*** 0.232*** 0.299*** 
 
4.272 7.112 9.037 
Q5a 0.109** 0.326*** 0.379*** 
 
2.117 6.836 7.330 
Q5b (Negative PO)  0.652*** 0.783*** 0.704*** 
 





Table 2.8 – Panel B (cont.): Regressions of Excess Stock Returns on 15 Portfolios 
Formed by PO and SOA on the Fama-French 5 factors: July 1970 thorugh Dec. 2018 
 





Q1 0.594*** 0.380*** 0.283*** 
 
14.313 9.694 6.543 
Q2 0.498*** 0.474*** 0.520*** 
 
14.504 14.589 13.554 
Q3 0.431*** 0.418*** 0.368*** 
 
14.424 12.434 8.772 
Q4 0.414*** 0.383*** 0.329*** 
 
14.444 11.550 9.771 
Q5a 0.278*** 0.208*** 0.151*** 
 
5.335 4.289 2.874 
Q5b (Negative PO)  0.074 0.120 0.168** 
 
0.555 1.427 2.075 





Q1 0.141** -0.129** -0.122* 
 
2.260 -2.191 -1.871 
Q2 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.177*** 
 
2.847 3.031 3.069 
Q3 0.171*** 0.111** 0.183*** 
 
3.806 2.192 2.890 
Q4 0.321*** 0.289*** 0.161*** 
 
7.446 5.790 3.174 
Q5a 0.480*** 0.360*** 0.126 
 
6.110 4.932 1.597 
Q5b (Negative PO)  0.388* 0.156 -0.059 
 
1.932 1.231 -0.479 





Q1 0.873 0.891 0.869 
 
2.023 1.909 2.111 
Q2 0.888 0.907 0.884 
 
1.672 1.582 1.869 
Q3 0.904 0.898 0.858 
 
1.456 1.638 2.045 
Q4 0.902 0.882 0.880 
 
1.395 1.614 1.641 
Q5a 0.724 0.809 0.798 
 
2.544 2.360 2.559 
Q5b (Negative PO)  0.460 0.701 0.713 
 
6.367 4.096 3.950 




Min observation per year 
Q1 20134 30261 24225 
 
21 28 34 
Q2 28844 34568 23486 
 
40 48 36 
Q3 31010 34733 22465 
 
38 61 26 
Q4 31574 32818 24887 
 
42 49 33 
Q5a 13800 18821 18569 
 
8 12 14 





Table 2.9 – Panel A: FF 5 Factor Intercepts from Excess Returns for 15 Portfolios Formed by 
PO and RelVol: July 1970 through Dec. 2018 
 
In this table I report the Fama-French 5-factor intercepts of portfolios formed by payout and the 
Relative Volatility (RelVol) measure of stickiness from July 1970 through December 2018. Intercepts 
are the average intercepts for each portfolio in each year. They represent the part of returns on the 
portfolios that is not explained by the Fama-French 5 factors: Market (Rm-Rf), Size (SMB), Book-to-
market ratio (HML), Profitability (RMW), and Investments (CMA). I calculate payouts as aggregate 
dividends payable to common shareholders (D) by earnings available for common shareholders (Y). 
Aggregate dividends (D) are calculated by multiplying dividends per share (DVPSX_C) by total 
common shares outstanding (CSHO). Earnings available for common shareholders (Y) are calculated 
by taking earnings before extraordinary items (IB) minus preferred dividends (DVP) plus income-
statement deferred tax (TXDI). RelVol is the ratio of the root mean squared errors from these two 
equations: 
                     
      and                           
     ,   
or 
        
    
    
.  
In each year breakpoints for High and Low RelVol are generated using data from NYSE firms only.  
Low and High RelVol firms are those that lie below the 30
th
 percentile and above the 70
th
 percentile 
breakpoints for RelVol in each year, respectively. The remaining 40% fall into the Med portfolio. 
Payout quintiles are formed annually by data generated using NYSE stocks only. Firms are listed from 
the highest to the lowest payout and breakpoints are generated accordingly. The ―Pooled Alpha‖ row 
shows the aggregate alphas for a portfolio containing all payout firms in each RelVol tercile. 
Negative-payout-ratio firms are considered the highest payout firms and placed in a separate bucket. I 
apply these breakpoints to all firms listed on the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ in each year and 
present the average Fama-French 5-factor intercepts for each portfolio. 
 
                                               
 
 
  RelVol   
Payout Quintile High Med Low High minus Low 
 
  
Q1 .073% .076% .203% .129% 
t( ) (.978) (1.004) (2.036)** (1.234) 
Q2 -.105% -.043% -.023% .081% 
t( ) (-1.414) (-.613) (-.310) (.931) 
Q3 -.009% -.074% -.173% -.163% 
t( ) (-.130) (-1.165) (-2.218)** (-1.865)* 
Q4 -.096% -.032% -.101% -.004% 
t( ) (-1.554) (-.502) (-1.428) (-.061) 
Q5a .005% -.414% -.264% -.269% 
t( ) (.055) (-3.830)*** (-2.496)** (-2.026)** 
Q5b (Negative PO)  -.440% -.399% -.567% -.127% 





Table 2.9 – Panel A (cont.): FF 5 Factor Intercepts from Excess Returns for 15 Portfolios 
Formed by PO and RelVol: July 1970 through Dec. 2018 
 
 
Q5-Q1 -.3% -.498% -.590% -.290% 
t( ) (-2.651)*** (-4.494)*** (-4.653)*** (-1.944)* 
     Pooled Alpha .326% .284% .254% -.071% 






Table 2.9 – Panel B: Regressions of Excess Stock Returns on 15 Portfolios Formed by 
PO and RelVol on the Fama-French 5 Factors: July 1970 through Dec 2018 
 
                                               
 
  RelVol 
Payout Quintile High Med Low 
 





Q1 1.097*** 1.101*** 1.082*** 
 
60.232 59.843 44.852 
Q2 1.015*** 1.037*** 1.034*** 
 
56.375 60.221 56.235 
Q3 0.987*** 1.040*** 1.043*** 
 
56.485 67.564 55.338 
Q4 0.935*** 0.976*** 0.966*** 
 
62.254 62.856 56.273 
Q5a 0.931*** 1.048*** 1.014*** 
 
37.240 40.157 39.712 
Q5b (Negative PO)  1.047*** 1.117*** 1.168*** 
 
17.443 28.019 28.967 
 





Q1 0.689*** 0.679*** 0.676*** 
 
26.417 25.757 19.570 
Q2 0.597*** 0.584*** 0.628*** 
 
23.142 23.659 23.831 
Q3 0.494*** 0.487*** 0.534*** 
 
19.743 22.070 19.778 
Q4 0.449*** 0.422*** 0.453*** 
 
20.862 18.977 18.420 
Q5a 0.513*** 0.519*** 0.612*** 
 
14.311 13.884 16.723 
Q5b (Negative PO)  1.110*** 0.774*** 1.034*** 
 
12.911 13.552 17.897 





Q1 0.145*** 0.199*** 0.249*** 
 
4.143 5.650 5.384 
Q2 0.163*** 0.240*** 0.246*** 
 
4.724 7.261 6.970 
Q3 0.242*** 0.291*** 0.290*** 
 
7.222 9.863 8.009 
Q4 0.156*** 0.226*** 0.255*** 
 
5.427 7.597 7.733 
Q5a 0.188*** 0.369*** 0.290*** 
 
3.913 7.364 5.911 
Q5b (Negative PO)  0.922*** 0.580*** 0.732*** 
 
8.004 7.577 9.449 
       
        
        







Table 2.9 – Panel B (cont.): Regressions of Excess Stock Returns on 15 Portfolios Formed by 
PO and RelVol on the Fama-French 5 Factors: July 1970 through Dec 2018 
 





Q1 0.494*** 0.396*** 0.363*** 
 
13.894 11.031 7.717 
Q2 0.504*** 0.486*** 0.480*** 
 
14.348 14.470 13.385 
Q3 0.447*** 0.388*** 0.398*** 
 
13.111 12.930 10.816 
Q4 0.413*** 0.355*** 0.280*** 
 
14.094 11.709 8.373 
Q5a 0.131*** 0.223*** 0.239*** 
 
2.688 4.380 4.804 
Q5b (Negative PO)  0.072 0.139* 0.178** 
 
0.612 1.783 2.263 





Q1 0.034 -0.110** -0.091 
 
0.636 -2.032 -1.286 
Q2 0.168*** 0.099* 0.172*** 
 
3.167 1.948 3.184 
Q3 0.131** 0.148*** 0.213*** 
 
2.549 3.273 3.844 
Q4 0.238*** 0.262*** 0.261*** 
 
5.386 5.742 5.167 
Q5a 0.295*** 0.265*** 0.356*** 
 
4.017 3.451 4.737 
Q5b (Negative PO)  -0.081 0.223* -0.076 
 
-0.459 1.906 -0.645 





Q1 0.907 0.909 0.848 
 
1.732 1.749 2.293 
Q2 0.889 0.901 0.889 
 
1.713 1.638 1.749 
Q3 0.884 0.915 0.880 
 
1.661 1.463 1.792 
Q4 0.900 0.900 0.882 
 
1.427 1.476 1.632 
Q5a 0.780 0.797 0.803 
 
2.378 2.481 2.429 
Q5b (Negative PO)  0.551 0.694 0.740 
 
5.708 3.792 3.836 




Min observation per year 
Q1 29488 33389 22176 
 
32 39 24 
Q2 29876 37508 25956 
 
41 54 39 
Q3 29093 38727 25480 
 
40 52 41 
Q4 30866 35643 26973 
 
37 45 41 
Q5a 16476 20305 18260 
 
13 13 10 







Table 2.10: Intercepts of Excess Returns for High-PO, High-Stickiness minus Low-PO, Low-
Stickiness portfolios 
 
In this table I report intercepts of a long–short investment strategy on the Fama-French 5-factor 
model. The portfolio goes long on firms in the high-minus-low portfolio of high-smoothing firms 
and short on the high-minus-low portfolio of low-smoothing firms. Portfolios are formed on a 
long–short investment strategy that goes long on a portfolio of high-payout, high-stickiness (Low 
SOA/RelVol) firms and short on a portfolio of low-payout, low stickiness (High SOA/RelVol) 
firms from July 1970 through December 2018 
 
                                               
 
 
  Equal weighted Value weighted 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables excret excret excret excret excret excret excret excret 
Constant -0.307** -0.114 -0.290* -0.182 -0.038 0.105 -0.467* -0.276 
SE (0.156) (0.155) (0.149) (0.148) (0.265) (0.261) (0.259) (0.260) 
t-stat (-1.968) (-0.736) (-1.945) (-1.229) (-0.143) (0.400) (-1.807) (-1.061) 
         mkt 0.127*** 0.093** 0.133*** 0.105*** 0.022 -0.014 0.058 -0.020 
SE (0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.064) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) 
t-stat (3.370) (2.557) (3.700) (3.038) (0.345) (-0.228) (0.928) (-0.327) 
smb 0.187*** 0.109** 0.135*** 0.102** 0.102 0.080 0.192** 0.139 
SE (0.054) (0.051) (0.052) (0.049) (0.092) (0.086) (0.089) (0.085) 
t-stat (3.460) (2.134) (2.607) (2.100) (1.120) (0.935) (2.150) (1.623) 
hml 0.119* -0.000 0.054 0.077 -0.038 -0.041 -0.230* 0.138 
SE (0.072) (0.055) (0.069) (0.052) (0.123) (0.093) (0.120) (0.092) 






































































Observations 582 582 582 582 582 582 582 582 
R-squared 0.066 0.062 0.042 0.039 0.003 0.008 0.041 0.011 
Vol Measure SOA SOA RelVol RelVol SOA SOA RelVol RelVol 





Table 2.11: Intercepts of Excess Returns on a High-PO, High-Stickiness minus Low-PO, Low-
Stickiness Portfolio 
 
In this table I report intercepts of a long–short investment strategy on two asset-pricing models; 
the Fama-French 5-factor and Carhart 4-factor models. Portfolios are formed on a long–short 
investment strategy that goes long on a portfolio of high-payout, high-stickiness (Low 
SOA/RelVol) firms and short on a portfolio of low-payout, low stickiness (High SOA/RelVol) 
firms from July 1970 through December 2018. 
 
                                               
 
  Equal weighted Value weighted 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables excret excret excret excret excret excret excret excret 
Constant -0.260** -0.258** -0.461*** -0.402*** -0.217 -0.187 -0.431** -0.248 
SE (0.132) (0.131) (0.125) (0.123) (0.175) (0.181) (0.168) (0.170) 
t-stat (-1.964) (-1.977) (-3.678) (-3.258) (-1.237) (-1.035) (-2.564) (-1.460) 
         mkt -0.010 -0.008 0.020 -0.002 -0.095** -0.133*** -0.042 -0.115*** 
 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.040) 
 
(-0.311) (-0.277) (0.651) (-0.067) (-2.237) (-3.126) (-1.043) (-2.897) 
smb 0.091** 0.190*** 0.061 0.140*** -0.061 0.055 -0.116** -0.082 
 
(0.046) (0.043) (0.043) (0.041) (0.061) (0.060) (0.058) (0.056) 
 
(1.980) (4.428) (1.399) (3.444) (-1.003) (0.919) (-1.989) (-1.476) 
hml 0.517*** 0.377*** 0.405*** 0.378*** 0.155* 0.372*** 0.263*** 0.498*** 
 
(0.061) (0.046) (0.058) (0.044) (0.081) (0.064) (0.078) (0.060) 
 












































































Observations 582 582 582 582 582 582 582 582 
R-squared 0.230 0.232 0.214 0.221 0.178 0.102 0.208 0.174 
Vol Measure SOA SOA RelVol RelVol SOA SOA RelVol RelVol 








Figure 2.1: Distribution of SOA and RelVol over the Sample Period 
 
This figure displays the time trend of the cross-sectional median SOA and RelVol from 1970 


















Figure 2.2: Low-payout minus High-payout Long–Short Strategy Performance over the Sample 
Period 
 
This figure displays the cumulative returns on an equal-weighted long–short investment strategy. 
This is the performance of a strategy that goes short on a portfolio of high-payout firms and long 






















Figure 2.3: Low-payout, Low-smoothing minus High-payout, High-smoothing Performance over 
the Sample Period – SOA 
 
This figure shows cumulative returns on an equal-weighted long–short investment strategy. This 
is the performance of a strategy that goes short on a portfolio of high-payout, high-stickiness 
(Low SOA) firms and long on a portfolio of low-payout, low-stickiness (High SOA) firms, from 





















Figure 2.4: Low-payout, Low-smoothing Minus High-payout, High-smoothing Performance 
over the Sample Period – RelVol 
 
This figure displays cumulative returns on an equal-weighted long–short investment strategy. 
This is the performance of a strategy that goes short on a portfolio of high-payout, high-stickiness 
(Low RelVol) firms and long on a portfolio of low-payout, low-stickiness (High RelVol) firms, 


























2.8 Supplemental information 
2.8.1 Robustness tests: Fama MacBeth 1973 regressions 
To test the robustness of our findings I conduct a Fama Macbeth 1973 (FMB) regression of three 
measures of payout on size, book-to-market, and operating profits. My sample consists of all non-
financial and non-utility firms in the intersection of the CRSP and Compustat dataset with data 
indicating dividends paid to common shareholders. To accurately observe the impact of the level 
of payout policy on share price I run my FMB regression twice, once with the entire sample of 
firms, which I show in Panel A, and another time with a subsample of only dividend-paying 
firms, displayed in Panel B.  
 
2.8.1.1 Steps for Constructing Table FMB1: 
I estimate the beta for each firm in each year as per Eq (1). Betas are estimated using the past five 
years of monthly returns. 
 
            (     )       
(8a) 
I then run regression (2) for every year, resulting in 48 years of coefficients (from 1970–2018) as 
the average for all firms in the market in that year. The main point here is that, unlike in Eq (1), 
the right-hand side variables are lagged. So I will have 48 observations of   :  
 
                                                 (     )
     (      )                         
(9) 
I then simply calculate the sample mean and variance of    and observe whether it is negative 
and significant. Here I take the firms with negative POs and give them the maximum PO level for 







2.8.1.2 Steps for Constructing Table FMB2: 
I construct this table following the same procedure that was used for Table FMB1. I calculate 
betas for each firm in each year as per Eq (1). Betas are estimated using the past five years of 
monthly returns: 
 
            (     )       
(8b) 
I then run regression (2) for every year, resulting in 48 years of coefficients (from 1970–2018) as 
the average for all firms in the market in that year:  
 
                                                          
                                            , 
(10) 
where        and         are dummies for firms in the lower and upper 30% of payout 
firms, respectively, in each year. Here I also take firms with negative POs and give them the 
maximum PO level for that year and winsorize at the 95% level in each year. There is an 






2.8.1.3 Steps for Constructing Table FMB3: 
I construct this table following the same procedure that was used to construct the two previous 
FMB tables. I estimate the beta for each firm in each year as per Eq (1). Betas are estimated using 
the past five years of monthly returns: 
 
            (     )      . 
(8c) 
I then run regression (2) for every year, resulting in 48 years of coefficients (from 1970–2018) as 
the average for all firms in the market in that year:  
 
                                                          
                                      . 
(11) 
 
I then simply calculate the sample mean and variance of    and observe whether it is negative 
and significant. Here firms with negative PO levels are assigned a dummy of 1 in the    factor 
and also get the value of maximum ln(PO) for their respective years for the    factor. Firms with 
positive POs are assigned a dummy of 0 in the    factor but they get their respective ln(PO) 









2.8.1.4 Tables: Fama MacBeth 1973 regression 
Supplementary Table 2.1: FMB1 Panel-A. Fama MacBeth 1973 regressions - Entire sample – 
Level of PO  
 
Dependent variables are monthly equity returns. Independent variables are equity betas using the 
past five-year monthly returns, one-month lagged market cap ln(Size), book-to-market equity 
using information available in December of the previous year ln(BM), operating profits using 
information available in December of the previous year ln(OP), Investments using information 
available in December of the previous year ln(INV), and cumulative past 12-month equity returns 
(Mom). Level of payout, PO, is the level of payout (D/Y) in any given year. Firms with negative 
payout ratios are assigned the value of 1 for the Neg PO dummy and also are assigned the 
maximum payout ratio value for that year. The sample includes all firms in the CRSP–Compustat 







Coefficient Mean Std. t(Mn) 
 
Mean Std. t(Mn) 
Intercept 1.733*** (0.394) (4.397) 
 
1.739*** (0.398) (4.368) 
Beta 0.028 (0.053) (0.533) 
 
0.023 (0.052) (0.452) 
Ln(Size) -0.384*** (0.072) (-5.318) 
 
-0.370*** (0.072) (-5.142) 
Ln(BM) -0.207** (0.085) (-2.427) 
 
-0.213** (0.086) (-2.463) 
Ln(OP) 0.265*** (0.063) (4.182) 
 
0.270*** (0.061) (4.436) 
Ln(INV) -0.058** (0.022) (-2.628) 
 
-0.077*** (0.021) (-3.566) 
Mom -0.004** (0.001) (-2.561) 
 
-0.004*** (0.001) (-3.085) 
PO 
    
-0.725*** (0.249) (-2.908) 
Neg PO 
    
-0.056 (0.159) (-0.351) 
        Average R2 0.055*** (0.006) (9.112) 
 







Supplementary Table 2.2: FMB2 Panel-A. Fama MacBeth 1973 regressions - Entire sample – 
High-Low PO dummy 
 
Dependent variables are monthly equity returns. Independent variables are equity betas using the 
past five-year monthly returns, one-month lagged market cap ln(Size), book-to-market equity 
using information available in December of the previous year ln(BM), operating profits using 
information available in December of the previous year ln(OP), Investments using information 
available in December of the previous year ln(INV), and cumulative past 12-month equity 
returns (Mom). PO Low and PO High are dummy variables for firms with payout levels below 
the 30
th
 percentile and above the 70
th
 percentile of payouts, respectively, in any given year. 
Firms with negative payout ratios and also are assigned the maximum payout ratio value for that 








Coefficient Mean Std. t(Mn) 
 
Mean Std. t(Mn) 
Intercept 1.733*** (0.394) (4.397) 
 
1.521*** (0.379) (4.009) 
Beta 0.028 (0.053) (0.533) 
 
0.026 (0.052) (0.498) 
Ln(Size) -0.384*** (0.072) (-5.318) 
 
-0.371*** (0.071) (-5.241) 
Ln(BM) -0.207** (0.085) (-2.427) 
 
-0.210** (0.085) (-2.463) 
Ln(OP) 0.265*** (0.063) (4.182) 
 
0.267*** (0.058) (4.623) 
Ln(INV) -0.058** (0.022) (-2.628) 
 
-0.071*** (0.021) (-3.387) 
Mom -0.004** (0.001) (-2.561) 
 
-0.004*** (0.001) (-3.111) 
PO low 
    
0.236*** (0.078) (3.023) 
PO high 
    
-0.056** (0.027) (-2.109) 
        Average R2 0.055*** (0.006) (9.112) 
 


























Supplementary Table 2.3: FMB3 Panel-A: Fama MacBeth 1973 regressions - Entire sample – 
Ln(PO) 
 
Dependent variables are monthly equity returns. Independent variables are equity betas using the 
past five-year monthly returns, one-month lagged market cap ln(Size), book-to-market equity 
using information available in December of the previous year ln(BM), operating profits using 
information available in December of the previous year ln(OP), Investments using information 
available in December of the previous year ln(INV), and cumulative past 12-month equity returns 
(Mom). The payout level is represented by the ln(PO) measure, which is the lognormal value of 
the payout level (D/Y) in any given year. Firms with negative payout ratios are assigned a value 
of 1 for the Neg PO dummy and also are assigned the maximum payout ratio value for that year. 




















Coefficient Mean Std. t(Mn) 
 
Mean Std. t(Mn) 
Intercept 1.733*** (0.394) (4.397) 
 
1.016** (0.450) (2.258) 
Beta 0.028 (0.053) (0.533) 
 
-0.010 (0.050) (-0.198) 
Ln(Size) -0.384*** (0.072) (-5.318) 
 
-0.326*** (0.099) (-3.293) 
Ln(BM) -0.207** (0.085) (-2.427) 
 
-0.171* (0.086) (-1.982) 
Ln(OP) 0.265*** (0.063) (4.182) 
 
0.261*** (0.081) (3.212) 
Ln(INV) -0.058** (0.022) (-2.628) 
 
-0.075*** (0.023) (-3.248) 
Mom -0.004** (0.001) (-2.561) 
 
-0.002 (0.002) (-0.838) 
Ln(PO) 
    
-0.162*** (0.053) (-3.033) 
Neg PO 
    
-0.073 (0.152) (-0.480) 
        Average R2 0.055*** (0.006) (9.112) 
 




Supplementary Table 2.4: FMB1 Panel-B. Fama MacBeth 1973 regressions – Subsample of 
dividend payers– Level of PO 
 
Dependent variables are monthly equity returns. Independent variables are equity betas using the 
past five-year monthly returns, one-month lagged market cap ln(Size), book-to-market equity 
using information available in December of the previous year ln(BM), operating profit using 
information available in December of the previous year ln(OP), Investments using information 
available in December of the previous year ln(INV), and cumulative past 12-month equity returns 
(Mom). Then payout level, PO, is payout level (D/Y) in any given year. Firms with negative 
payout ratios are assigned a value of 1 for the Neg PO dummy and also are assigned the 
maximum payout ratio value for that year. The regressions run for a subsample of dividend 






Coefficient Mean Std. t(Mn) 
 
Mean Std. t(Mn) 
Intercept 1.063** (0.456) (2.330) 
 
1.137** (0.458) (2.484) 
Beta 0.053 (0.065) (0.815) 
 
0.045 (0.063) (0.719) 
Ln(Size) -0.310*** (0.104) (-2.984) 
 
-0.275** (0.104) (-2.650) 
Ln(BM) -0.135 (0.083) (-1.617) 
 
-0.130 (0.082) (-1.587) 
Ln(OP) 0.271*** (0.089) (3.047) 
 
0.236** (0.090) (2.633) 
Ln(INV) -0.064*** (0.022) (-2.910) 
 
-0.078*** (0.022) (-3.612) 
Mom 0.001 (0.002) (0.322) 
 
-0.000 (0.002) (-0.238) 
PO 
    
-0.427*** (0.144) (-2.968) 
Neg PO 
    
0.143 (0.218) (0.656) 
        Average R2 0.081*** (0.009) (8.594) 
 






Supplementary Table 2.5: FMB2 Panel-B. Fama MacBeth 1973 regressions – Subsample of 
dividend payers– High-Low PO dummy 
 
Dependent variables are monthly equity returns. Independent variables are equity betas using the 
past five-year monthly returns, one-month lagged market cap ln(Size), book-to-market equity 
using information available in December of the previous year ln(BM), operating profits using 
information available in December of the previous year ln(OP), Investments using information 
available in December of the previous year ln(INV), and cumulative past 12-month equity 
returns (Mom). PO Low and PO High are dummy variables for firms with payout levels below 
the 30
th
 percentile and above the 70
th
 percentile of payouts, respectively, in any given year. 
Firms with negative payout ratios are assigned the maximum payout ratio value for that year. 







Coefficient Mean Std. t(Mn) 
 
Mean Std. t(Mn) 
Intercept 1.063** (0.456) (2.330) 
 
0.992** (0.454) (2.188) 
Beta 0.053 (0.065) (0.815) 
 
0.057 (0.065) (0.879) 
Ln(Size) -0.310*** (0.104) (-2.984) 
 
-0.273** (0.110) (-2.473) 
Ln(BM) -0.135 (0.083) (-1.617) 
 
-0.124 (0.082) (-1.522) 
Ln(OP) 0.271*** (0.089) (3.047) 
 
0.233** (0.097) (2.412) 
Ln(INV) -0.064*** (0.022) (-2.910) 
 
-0.072*** (0.021) (-3.472) 
Mom 0.001 (0.002) (0.322) 
 
-0.000 (0.002) (-0.227) 
PO low 
    
0.122 (0.083) (1.463) 
PO high 
    
-0.139** (0.057) (-2.460) 
        Average R2 0.081*** (0.009) (8.594) 
 


















Supplementary Table 2.6: FMB3 Panel-B. Fama MacBeth 1973 regressions – Subsample of 
dividend payers– Ln(PO) 
 
Dependent variables are monthly equity returns. Independent variables are equity betas using the 
past five-year monthly returns, one-month lagged market cap ln(Size), book-to-market equity 
using information available in December of the previous year ln(BM), operating profits using 
information available in December of the previous year ln(OP), Investments using information 
available in December of the previous year ln(INV), and cumulative past 12-month equity returns 
(Mom). The payout level is represented by the ln(PO) measure, which is the lognormal value of 
the payout level (D/Y) in any given year. Firms with negative payout ratios are assigned the value 
of 1 for the Neg PO dummy and are also assigned the maximum payout ratio value for that year. 







Coefficient Mean Std. t(Mn) 
 
Mean Std. t(Mn) 
Intercept 1.063** (0.456) (2.330) 
 
0.852* (0.447) (1.906) 
Beta 0.053 (0.065) (0.815) 
 
0.049 (0.064) (0.771) 
Ln(Size) -0.310*** (0.104) (-2.984) 
 
-0.282*** (0.105) (-2.687) 
Ln(BM) -0.135 (0.083) (-1.617) 
 
-0.131 (0.083) (-1.582) 
Ln(OP) 0.271*** (0.089) (3.047) 
 
0.245*** (0.090) (2.712) 
Ln(INV) -0.064*** (0.022) (-2.910) 
 
-0.076*** (0.021) (-3.616) 
Mom 0.001 (0.002) (0.322) 
 
-0.000 (0.002) (-0.204) 
Ln(PO) 
    
-0.111** (0.044) (-2.508) 
Neg PO 
    
0.046 (0.203) (0.227) 
        Average R2 0.081*** (0.009) (8.594) 
 





















2.8.2 Variable and Acronym Definitions 
Variable Variable Definition 
Total Assets AT 
Deferred income tax TXDI 
Income before extraordinary items  IB 
Preferred dividends DVP 
Earnings (Y) Calculated as (IB) – (DVP) + (TXDI) 
Dividends per share Common dividends (DVPSX_C) 
Total shares outstanding CSHO 
Total Dividends (D) Calculated as (DVPSX_C) * (CSHO) 
Payout (PO) Total Dividends / Earnings (Y) 
Total Shareholders’ equity Shareholders equity – Parent (SEQ) 
Total Liabilities LT 
Leverage  (LT) / (AT) 
Earnings per share EPSPX 
Price per share PRCC_F 
Market cap (PRCC_F) * (CSHO) 
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